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1
Introduction
The Congressional Research Services identifies a mass shooting as a public act of violence with
at least four victims who are chosen indiscriminately by one or more gunmen.1 The curious thing about
the CRS' definition is that it makes an express point to exclude robbery and terrorism. It is correct and
productive for the writers of the CRS study to separate the mass shooting from criminality and terrorism
to focus their research. In a larger discussion about modern violence, however, separating the mass
shooting as an event from other forms of modern violence can be counterproductive in that it presents it
as an anomaly, as opposed to an outcome of a given society or historical trend. The CRS definition is
nonetheless very useful in the discussion of mass shootings as media events, however, precisely because
it separates the mass shooting from media discourses on criminality and terrorism respectively.
A mass shooting is not identified here as an act of public violence, but a case where mass media
and government officials have arranged such an incident under the category of “mass shooting”. Note
that in the recent shooting in a gay nightclub in Orlando, various media outlets and politicians seemed to
trip over themselves attempting to determine whether it was a “terrorist attack” or “mass shooting.”2
Was it politically motivated, personally motivated, Islamist related, homophobic, repressed gay self-hate
on the shooter's part, or a simple case of mental illness? All terrorists have personal motivations and all
personal experiences and ideals have a social and historical context, which means that the debate over
terrorist attack or mass shooting is a debate about what the attack should represent and how it should be
demarcated in mass media discussions of violence, security, mental illness, and firearm policy.
Media commentators have made the point that mass shootings are frequently committed by white
men with right wing views, while terrorist attacks are typically committed by men of color, often of a
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Muslim background and pledging allegiance to radical Islamist groups.3 This speaks to the discourse of
terrorism in the Western world post-9-11, wherein “terrorism” is most often used to refer to a threat to a
nation from outsiders (radical Islamists as the largest category) as opposed to pathological actions taken
by citizens of the nation.
The most theorized terrorist attack of the 21st century thus far is the 9/11 attacks on New York
City and Washington DC, in which the iconic twin towers of the World Trade Center were destroyed by
airplanes hijacked by men pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda. Opinions on the attack were certainly
heterogeneous, but what stood out most clearly as a point of agreement was that the World Trade Center
was attacked for its symbolic significance. Theorists of terrorism, mass media, and communication have
expanded on this basic observation to conclude that the attack itself was intended as an act of
communication, media discourse specifically.4 To these scholars, the attackers studied the symbolic
vocabulary of American mass media and chose a target with great symbolic significance, ensuring that
the American and global mass media would do the remaining work for them of delivering their
ideological message.
If we conclude here that a central element of terrorism is communication, specifically within the
field of mass media, we can then move to a new field of inquiry in which the mass shooting as media
event is also considered from the standpoint of an act of mediated communication, in which the media
coverage of the shooting is consciously influenced by the shooter themselves. We can now perceive a
wide trend of “personal 9/11s” in which numerous individuals put their own spin on the 2001 attacks
and tried to articulate their own viewpoint via the discourse of the mass media. In the chapters that
follow, we will consider two cases: the bombing and shooting attacks in 2011 by Norway’s Anders
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Breivik, and the shooting and stabbing attacks in the United States in 2014 by Elliot Rodger. In both
cases, we can see how an act of public violence effectively constituted a communicative act, and
delivered a specific ideological message through the mass media.
The mass shooting is an American phenomenon in some ways, and is often attributed to
American cultural attitudes about violence and firearms.5 However, Europe and East Asia have also seen
similar attacks. The relevance of the questions at hand to the discipline of world history is quite simply
that mass communication is a global phenomenon, and that the mass shootings in the United States have
their overseas counterparts, and it may be true that the proliferation of transnational mass media
networks has created the specific breed of mass shooting we have seen thus far in the 21st century. In
2011, Anders Behring Breivik conducted bombing and shooting attacks on Oslo, Norway’s capital, and
the island of Utoya, a popular destination for summer camps. Police found that Breivik had acted alone
after his arrest, but nonetheless the assault on Utoya shook Norway to the core, and it shocked the world
that such a thing could happen in such a peaceful nation.
Much like the wake of mass shootings in the United States, mass media coverage of the attack in
Norway and abroad centered around the causation for the attack, with various interest groups and
thinkers attempting to pin the blame on forces and individuals as it benefited their agenda. Anti-racist
activists blamed racism and Islamophobia, right wing groups blamed European elites and Muslim
immigration itself, feminists blamed misogyny, and many mass media outlets blamed Breivik's supposed
mental illness and troubled family background. In consideration of Breivik’s attacks, the pattern which
emerges most conspicuously is that of a political Rorscach test. Media commentators have found a way
to incorporate the attacks into their own weltanschauung across the board, and as we see later all of
Breivik’s opponents immediately grasped that they were under attack. Breivik was very cooperative
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with the media, and happy to explain his views and motivations not only to the authorities but also many
journalists and scholars. Not only that, he sent copies of his manifesto to numerous media outlets and
has made every effort to popularize himself during his incarceration. Breivik himself succeeded in
articulated his ideological point, and remains an important point of reference for “right wing populists”
in Europe. In any case, Norway does not share lax firearm regulations with the United States, nor would
anyone say that Norwegians and Americans have the same “culture of violence.” This suggests that the
historical causation for the proliferation of mass shootings may not in fact be specifically local to the
United States.
Three years later in the United States, an attack both starkly different and oddly similar occurred
in Isla Vista, California. Twenty-year-old Elliot Rodger stabbed 3 men to death in his apartment before
attempting a shooting attack on a University of California, Santa Barbara sorority and then embarking
on a shooting rampage across the city before fleeing from police and taking his own life. Rodger also
sent out a manifesto, and while it contained brief discussions of race and other social concerns, the
fulcrum of Rodger's thought was avowed misogyny and a hostility toward sexuality and people who
experienced fulfilling sexual relationships.6 Much of Rodger's online activity bemoaned his lack of
success in forming relationships with women, and speculated on why he struggled so much in this
pursuit. In his manifesto, he finally concluded that women themselves were to blame, and that he would
have his revenge on the world itself by executing an attack on “UCSB's hottest sorority”. He failed in
this pursuit, but much like Breivik his attack did spark a nationwide conversation.7 In this case as well,
various interest groups found different culprits and sought to assimilate this media event to their agenda.
Feminists blamed misogyny, gun control advocates blamed the availability of firearms, some right-wing
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commentators claimed he was a leftist, and the “pick up artists” of the world claimed that the world
needed more of their “game” to prevent similar killings in the future. As we look over the media
coverage of Rodger’s attacks, we will see that the topics in play connect to most of the cultural struggles
in today’s American political landscape. Rodger’s attacks and ideas are especially relevant to today’s
discourse on gender. The mass media also pathologized Rodger in the same manner seen in coverage of
Breivik, and focused on his emotional and psychological issues as the leading factor in the attack.
It would be reasonable to suggest that the choice of Breivik and Rodger as cases for comparison
may seem arbitrary. In response, we offer that there are a few key themes in the attacks and writings of
both men, and that between the two of them a clear narrative can be constructed of reactionary politics
and violence on a global scale. The shared points of contention for Breivik and Rodger are white
identity, misogyny, and masculinity. This can be grasped from reading their manifestos, which are both
lengthy and contain explicitly articulated positions on these issues, and from reading their attacks as
textual and rhetorical acts. If there is a common assertion between Breivik and Rodger, it is the assertion
of white masculinity against a perceived cultural order in which whiteness and maleness are increasingly
devalued.
If we recall the Congressional Research Service's definition of a mass shooting, Rodger's and
arguably Breivik's attacks fall under it neatly. The narrative which reduces their attacks to the actions of
mentally ill men also fits neatly with the Killer Virgin theory of the New York Post8 on Rodger and the
“Breivik's Mum Sexualised Him” musings of the Telegraph.9 The New York Post’s “Killer Virgin”
narrative boils Rodger’s attack down to his sexual frustration, and the Telegraph’s coverage attributes
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Breivik’s supposed mental illness to possible abuse by his mother. If we accept the premise that neither
Breivik nor Rodger were terrorists, as the Post and Guardian seem to imply, then they fit Congress's
definition of “mass shooters”. Because mental illness is the only possible cause that (arguably) does not
carry a political context, it follows logically that Breivik and Rodger's attacks must necessarily be acts of
the mentally ill. Considering the mass shooting as the act of mentally ill person is to remove it from its
social context, and thus remove it from history. In scholarly work by mental health professionals on the
matter of mass shootings, we see starkly different conclusions. Jonathan M. Metzl and Kenneth T.
MacLeish asserted that there is no statistical evidence linking mental illness to gun violence, and that the
implication that mental illness is the prime causal factor in mass shootings mostly serves to deflect
attention from other possible causes.10 Metzl and MacLeish are primarily referring to gun control and
gun culture debates in their piece, and they draw from historical sources to show that mental illness has
been employed in numerous points in American history as a panacea for discussion of controversial
cultural or social issues. Moving forward from their insight, we endeavor to identify the other factors in
question.
It is unacceptable to consider either of these attacks in a vacuum and locate them entirely within
the individual actors, given the work being conducted today on subjectivity, terrorism, mass media,
communications, and violence itself. “Madness” itself as a concept has been shown by many scholars to
carry a fundamental historical context, and has been used in numerous societies and periods to cordon
off undesirable elements or ideas and symbols which were incompatible with the functional discourse of
a power structure.11 In an era where nation states and international governing bodies endeavor to move
beyond politics and focus on expert administration and technical proficiency, it is not shocking that
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terrorist attacks by first world citizens from middle class homes would be archived under madness, but
this error should not proceed unimpeded. Moreover, old theoretical frameworks cannot be implied to a
newly minted media event, and commonly held assumptions about subjectivity and media cannot be
applied. If these presuppositions were applicable to Breivik and Rodger's cases, there would be no need
for a debate.
Mass shootings have come to serve as sliding signifiers for social tensions in Western mass
societies in that the discussion of any attack quickly becomes a screen for other ideological battles. In
fact, it appears that the mass shootings which touch the most cultural conflicts receive the most media
coverage. To connect to an ongoing conflict in a society's media discourse, a mass shooter can either
mention it in his manifesto, speak on the issue in the media, or, perhaps most effectively, attack targets
which carry symbolic relevance to the debate or represent a group or idea in the nation's culture. Rodger,
for example, targeted a sorority, which especially in American college movies is a metaphor for feminine
beauty and sexuality, which ultimately stands in for male sexual entitlement and fulfillment. Breivik
attacked a youth program for Norway's labor party, specifically on an idyllic island which many
Norwegians hold to be the “happiest place in Norway.” Both men attacked soft targets with high
symbolic values in their context, and as we will see later a reading of their biographies will show that
their targets carried great meaning in both their personal and political subjectivities.
Considering modern societies as webs of mediated communication and accounting for the advent
of social media and the shifting definitions of fame and celebrity, we can concur with media scholars
that the distinction between “everyday life” and some form of mediated communication may be
increasingly blurred, and that even the distinction between an attempt to influence media discourse and
media discourse itself may need to be discarded.12 In short, the mass shooting as a media event is itself
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an act of mediated communication between the mass shooter and their society. “Madness” has been
defined in some cases as speech which is incomprehensible in the discourse of the power structure 13, but
in the case of Breivik and Rodger very direct political and cultural statements were made, in a directly
discursive and communicative manner. While the mass shooting as defined by the CRS is not a new
phenomenon, the “mass shooting” as media event can only meaningfully be grasped as a communicative
act, and reveals within itself the deep penetration of new media forms and styles into everyday life, not
only in the American context but globally as well.
Communication, or a perceived struggle to communicate, is the common thread running through
Breivik and Rodger's respective lives. Both men struggled to form and maintain meaningful
relationships, at first in the home, then in school, and then with women as adults. For whatever reason,
be it genetics, parental neglect, or a negative environment in childhood, both men struggled as children
to assimilate to the vocabulary of their surroundings, that is, they struggled to speak. Breivik had
difficulty in preschool, to the point where he was almost taken into custody by the state, and Rodger had
social difficulties as a child which developed into an Asperger's Syndrome diagnosis and long history of
psychiatric care. Both men were the product of troubled and dissolved marriages, and had troubled
relationships with both parents.
Their experiences of adolescence also did not match with the media they consumed, to the point
where Rodger wrote in his manifesto that his life's failure to match the film “Alpha Dog” was a
contributing factor in his choice to commit an act of violence. Both men looked to alternative ideologies
and subjectivities to explain their experiences, ultimately in search of a new language and the tools to
speak. The relevance of this fact to world history is that Breivik and Rodger looked to the same global
communications regime for the tools to rearticulate their experiences, and in some cases found the same
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ideas and images, a new development relative to earlier generations in both their societies. Breivik found
graffiti and rap music, then right wing populism, while Rodger sifted through various corners of the
internet, looking for explanations for his difficulties with women. Both men were unsuccessful in every
case, and chose to embrace the most prominent form of political speech in the modern world: violence.
It is also important to note here that gun violence is a prominent occurrence in modern mass media,
especially that consumed by young men.14 While Douglas Kellner creates a causal link between this
basic fact and an increase in these attacks, where his analysis falls short is in failing to consider the
shifting structure of mass media itself. While their biographies have important parallels and there is
something to be said for basic motivations for violence and the psychological makeup of a person who
can commit such an atrocity, the mass shooting as an actual event can be debated until the end of time
by policy analysts and criminologists. The mass shooting as a media event can, ironically, be readily
apprehended as it exists in the abstract.
The actions of Breivik and Rodger are horrific by any standard, even their closest ideological
compatriots made an explicit point to reject their attacks. Similarly, the views they expressed in their
writings and internet activities are abhorrent and fundamentally in conflict with the basic values of their
societies. In combination, the political and personal “speech” of their attacks, as much as it was an
assault on what they identified as their personal antagonists (the Norwegian state, women at university),
was also an attack as what they identified as the authority and power in their personal worlds. In short,
in both cases we see an assertion of white male subjectivity versus a hostile and oppressive “other”,
whatever form that may take.
We cannot, however, write them off as “mad” or allow other commentators and theorists to put
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their acts into the service of their own agendas. Instead, it is imperative that we allow these murderers to
“speak” in these pages, and respond to their assertions in kind. It is also crucial that we identify the
specific social antagonisms which inform their worldviews and actions, and uncover why they ended up
on one side or another. Much like history, in some ways the “mass shooting” says much more about the
21st century “postmodern” West than the 21st century “postmodern” West can say about the mass
shooting. Through the symptom of the mass shooting, it is our duty to work backwards.
Franco “Bifo” Birardi theorizes that the mass shooter is part of a global wave of suicides and
mass murders which show the human body and mind disintegrating under the pressure of an
increasingly brutal financial capitalism15. Other theorists have asserted that the mass shooting is the
product of an increasingly de-centered white masculinity fighting back against minority rights,
feminism, and a decline in earning potential and job security. Another theory is that the mass shooting is
a “copycat” variation on suicide bombings, and that mass shooters are attacking “neoliberal hegemony”
via the same methodology as their counterparts overseas. Girardians focus on “mimetic rivalry” and
would theorize that the failure to build successful relationships or create stable emotional lives leaves
the attackers with only violence as a recourse.16 While some of these interpretations are more cogent
than others, what they share is a focus on the mass shootings as symptomatic of larger historical trends,
or as an outcome of a specific context. In theorizing the mass shooting, it is important to look for
structural and systemic factors in both national locales and global historical developments, rather than
focusing on one specific conflict such as gender or racism. While misogyny could certainly be identified
as the fulcrum of Rodger's attack, it does not fully explain Breivik's. Racism and misogyny are also
systemic cultural and structural problems, and as such inform the experience and worldview of modern
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subjects across the board. Not every modern subject commits a mass shooting, ergo there must be other
factors.
If any preliminary hypothesis will be offered at this point, it will be that the proliferation and
consolidation of mass media outlets across the globe during the last 20 years of the 20 th century have
created a global communications regime, and in turn created a global intersubjectivity. What is meant by
this is that as modern subjects increasingly refer to the same mass media apparatuses to construct their
senses of themselves and their societies, they have and will continue to find themselves assimilated into
the same global semiotic order. In the case of Norway and the United States, for example, the
availability of American film and television programming in both settings has created a scenario in
which Anders Breivik and Elliot Rodger would have similar referents in the construction of their
respective subjective experiences of the world. While the images and concepts that appear in both of
their “textual attacks” are similar, what is most crucial in considering the similarity of their attacks is the
rise of the infrastructure which delivered the same information and imagery to both young men. Most
importantly, gun violence has been a pervasive cultural and symbolic image in the media consumed by
both men and many young men across the Western world.
Theoretical Framework
In considering the mass shooting as an act of mediated communication, it is important to construct a basic theoretical model of how mediated communication itself functions in the late 20th/early
21st century world and what should be taken to constitute an act of mediated communication. On the
question of the historicization of the mass shooting it is also necessary to clarify the relationship between modernity and mediated communication, and try to establish a working model for the mechanics
of how subjectivity is created and maintained by mass media in the “mass societies” of the Western
world from the early 20th century to the present.

12
The first claim in play in these chapters is that the mass shooting, rather than being simply defined via the Congressional Research Institute definition, is as much a media event as it is something
which occurs in material space and is then reported and reframed by the mass media. Collapsing the dichotomy between “event” and “media coverage” is the first order of business. For a workable definition
of the media event, we turn to Daniel Dayan and Elihui Katz’ “Defining Media Events”, printed in
McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory. For Dayan and Katz, the chief difference between a media
event and other forms of broadcasting is that a media event is not routine, and can be identified as a disruption of normal media coverage.17 It is important to clarify that Dayan and Katz are referring in their
piece to scheduled events such as the funeral of Princess Diana or the World Cup soccer championship.
Considering this fact, their claims about the significance of media events cannot of course be directly
transposed onto impromptu media coverage of a mass killing in Oslo, and some qualifications must be
made. Collapsing the dichotomy between the passive consumer and active producer of mass media will
be the first step, and will be discussed in a few paragraphs.
Dayan and Katz go on to explain that the function of the media event is the harmonization of its
viewers into one “collective heartbeat”, and the unification of a society’s citizens into one coherent moment of solidarity. A royal wedding in the United Kingdom is presented as a chief example.18 The
scheme that Dayan and Katz present is highly schematic and organized, if not intentional. In their view,
governments and other political entities collaborate with media organizations to produce media coverage
designed to influence viewers’ perceptions and created a feeling of solidarity and universal belonging in
each polity. This raises the question of whether this level of coordination is necessary for a media event
to have this effect, or whether the relationship between coverage and reception of an event should be
Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz, "Defining Media Events." In McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory, edited by Dennis
McQuail (London: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 90-99.
18
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problematized or reconsidered. Moreover, is it possible that impromptu coverage of unplanned events
could serve a similar purpose? For the 21st century context, the most useful unplanned media event to
consider for this question is the September 11th terrorist attacks in 2001. For our purposes, 9/11 is especially useful considering the complicated relationship between mass shootings and terrorism as discursive entities.
Jane Caputi curiously employs a Jungian framework to explain American response to the 9/11
attacks. For Caputi, the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks specifically chose the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center as a target due to their symbolic significance, and hence the reaction the attacks would garner.19 This a noncontroversial stance amongst theorists of mass media, echoed by semiotician Jean
Baudrillard,20 performance studies theorist Richard Schechner,21 and others. Baudrillard opens his essay
referring to the exact media events discussed by Dayan and Katz, namely royal weddings and sporting
significance, but notes that 9/11 was the first media event of “global symbolic significance.”22 This to
say that while Princess Diana’s funeral or a State of the Union address from President Barack Obama
may serve a purpose in each polity, their global significance is limited.
Drawing links between these concepts, we can see that 9/11 is a media event which was created
not by mass media organizations themselves, but by the perpetrators via the mass media. Considering
this transition, we can begin to piece out a scheme in which the perpetrators of a terrorist attack focus on
a target for its symbolic value, attack the target, and then watch as the mass media delivers their precise
ideological message to the consumer. Rather than a simple top down system in which “the media” produces a series of images and narratives which it then beams down to the viewer, we can see the mass
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media as a field of struggle and communication between different facets of society, a view in line with
the media theorists of Britain’s Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Stuart Hall, one of the Centre’s leading theorists, originated a model for understanding media messages labeled the “Decoding/Encoding” system. Hall’s system, despite its simplicity, is remarkably versatile and has been employed by
scholars across numerous disciplines. In “The Television Discourse: Encoding and Decoding”, Hall
notes that media communication is much more productively regarded with respect to its symbolic content, and that any “raw historical event” must be translated into a “televisual” language before it can be
transmitted and regarded by an audience.23
Put in literal terms, we consider Anders Breivik’s actual act of shooting dozens of youths on the
Norwegian island of Utoya as a “raw historical event,” and the ensuing media coverage as the translation of said event into televisual (or digital/online) discourse. The argument here is that the actual attack,
the media coverage of the attack, and the public response to the media coverage, all constitute parts of a
cohesive and complementary system. Namely, that the “mass shooting” is best understood as a communicative act in which the shooter intentionally creates a media event via an act of mass violence in the
public sphere.
The nuts and bolts of Hall’s encoding/decoding scheme are relatively straightforward. The most
important element of Hall’s theory is that it allows for more agency on the part of the viewer or consumer than other theorists. For Hall, a message is encoded within a televisual language of signs and
symbols, and then decoded by the audience in several different ways.24 While a sign-oriented reading of
a media image is not a new idea, the notion of a series of different readings is the genius of Hall’s theory. In the encoding/decoding theory, any media message or product is decoded by audience in one of
Stuart Hall, "The Television Discourse: Encoding and Decoding." In McQuail’s Mass Communication Theory, edited by
Dennis McQuail,. (London: Sage Publications 2005.) p. 302-309.
24
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three ways. The audience may perceive the message in the dominant/hegemonic way, in which they receive the transmission the way they are intended to by the sender (British state media or CNN for example). The second reading of the event is the negotiated position, where the audience accepts the basic
premise of the transmission but leave room for their own interests or perspective. The final reading is the
“oppositional” decoding of the message, in which the viewer rejects the message or concludes opposite
that intended by the sender25. This theory of mass communication can be applied to mass shootings in
the following ways:
1. Mass shooters, like the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, choose targets for their symbolic
value. Hence, their tactics and choice of targets themselves constitute the “encoding” of a
message.
2. A mass shooting, as a media event, can be regarded or decoded in numerous different
ways by its audience. For example, many feminists viewed Anders Breivik’s attacks as
essentially anti-woman, while anti-racists viewed them as acts of white supremacist aggression.
3. Anecdotally, or perhaps crucially, many mass shooters have been demonstrated to have
been highly prolific consumers of mass media. This would suggest that they themselves
were highly fluent in televisual discourse, and would thus be highly adept at encoding
their attacks as acts of mediated communication.
In the chapters to follow, we will argue that the mass shooting has been an act of mediated communication in which public acts of violence are intentionally planned for the symbolic significance of their targets, and media apparatuses deliver whatever message the shooter encoded in their attack.

25

Stuart Hall, pp. 302-309.

16
Even with a coherent theoretical structure in place for conceptualizing the mass shooting, we still
have some work to do. The problem with the ideas in place thus far is that they function in the present
tense, and hence are ahistorical. This leaves us in the position of needing to demonstrate how the work
herein contributes to a historical understanding of the mass shooting as a media event. In John P.
Thompson’s The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media, the core argument is that we can
consider the development of mass societies from the perspective of the development of technologies of
mediated communication. This is simple enough, and not particularly novel considering the career of
Marshall McLuhan and company, but Thompson adds another key element to the discussion. For
Thompson, mass media both as a technology and as an institution is inextricably linked with the development and maintenance of the public sphere, or simply the public. The public sphere is a popular concept amongst theorists, and simply refers to the spaces in modern societies which are beyond the direct
control of the state or other institutions. For Jurgen Habermas the rise of bourgeois society and Enlightenment ideals was directly linked to the development of spaces where free debate and discussion could
take place, and the invention of new technologies for circulating and disseminating sophisticated concepts.26
Thompson’s argument hinges upon the claim that the key to understanding the relationship between mass media and modernity is understanding the role mediated communication plays in the ongoing creation of the public sphere. Mass shootings are by definition acts of public violence, in that they
almost always take place in public places. Thus, a renegotiated relationship between the public and private spheres is an important component of the mass shooting as a discursive act. Most importantly, what
we consider to be public or private matters and the dichotomy itself are all products of historical forces.
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The most basic point gleaned here from Thompson’s work is the notion that self and subjectivity
in the modern world are fundamentally tied to mediated communication on a mass scale.27 Put simply,
subjects in modern societies construct their self-image from symbols and images they receive via the
mass media, and experience the possibility of constructing a worldview partially or completely unmoored from their physical locale.28 Adopting this view from Thompson opens the possibility of combining theories of subjectivity with theories of mass media, and necessitates that we “open up” the modern subject into a field in which a mass shooter, for example, develops their identity and worldview in
conversation not only with their direct experiences but also with images and concepts from mass media.
Televisual discourse, in this case, ceases to be a language external to the modern subject but becomes to
a certain extent the language of their internal monologue. In a field of ideas renegotiated thusly, what
distinction is there between a media event as planned by television producers, a terrorist attack designed
for its ripple effects in mass media coverage, or even an interaction between two people in material
space?
There are other historical factors present in Thompson’s analysis. From a world history perspective, we can contemplate his claims on the global proliferation of mass media outlets, as well as their
consolidation under a few conglomerates. Thompson notes that not only has mediated communication
spread across the world, that the actual control of the content and physical infrastructure has increasingly
been concentrated in the hands of a few actors.29 This would be a significant development in and of itself, but Thompson also adds that this process has increasingly continued without respect to the borders
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of nation-states, and that thus the insights of previous theorists of the mass media and communicative
rationality have become increasingly obsolete.30
As a historical development, we can contemplate the rise of a global communications system in
which subjectivities and worldviews are constructed from increasingly similar options in terms of symbolic content. For an example, we can consider the spread of American action movies throughout the
world, and notice that films like “Robocop” or “Reservoir Dogs” have been consumed both here in the
United States but also in such far flung locales as Tokyo or Stockholm. What this means is that the identities and subjectivities of young men in these places have become increasingly intelligible to one another, and increasingly constructed from the same referents. This is a related concept to Frederic Jameson’s theory of singular modernity, in which the end of the cold war and proliferation of global capitalism has increasingly created a world in which one vision of modernity and progress reigns supreme over
all human reality.31 We can also consider this development as an increased state of global intertextuality,
in which media events and other discursive acts increasingly contain the same symbolic content and
have become more and more intelligible outside of their immediate contexts. For another example, we
can refer to the influence of Japanese anime cartoons on the 1980s film “Blade Runner”, and even further into the past the reworking of American noir and western films by Japanese and European filmmakers. It is also important to note that the basic image of a man with a gun shooting numerous enemies is
one of the most common images in all these forms of media, to the point where filmic violence has become referential to other filmic violence, as opposed to so called real world violence.32 If the boundary
between the real world and the mediated world is increasingly porous, then this process can also affect
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acts of violence in the real world. Breivik himself claimed that he used video games to train for his attacks,33 and Rodger too was an avid game player.34 While gaming and film do not necessarily carry the
same role in modern societies, we can at the very least point to a connection between violent media and
violent acts in the lives of the two men.
It is important to bring these new ideas into conversation with the theories we formulated earlier
in the chapter. From Dayan and Katz, we extracted the concept of a media event, a disruption in normal
media coverage which serves the purpose of bringing audiences together. With Jean Baudrillard and
Jane Caputo, we observed that terrorist attacks often serve the same purpose as media events, and can
often be taken to constitute the same thing. This created a scheme in which mass media is a field of
communication and struggle, rather than a single institution sending messages to consumers. For an intelligible system of how these struggles and discourse function, we turned to Stuart Hall, who showed
that messages are encoded with a specific set of symbols and images, and that the subjectivity of the
consumer is as important in the process of mediated communication as the intentions of the sender. This
left us with a theory of the mass shooting as a planned communicative act in which a specific message is
delivered through an act of violence and the ensuing media coverage. Critical to this theory is the conception of the act itself and its media coverage as one cohesive system, and the symbolic value of the
targets and the tactics of the shooter as a process of encoding their message.
It is also imperative to take a moment to clarify what is meant by “whiteness”. Whiteness and
white male identity are signifiers and cultural ideas which will make regular appearances in the chapters
to follow, and it is important to demonstrate the historical and cultural significance of “whiteness” as a
concept. It may seem strange that explicit references to whiteness or white identity do not appear in
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Breivik or Rodger’s manifestos, and at the same time these very ideas are commonly employed to make
sense of their ideas and rhetoric. Neil Altman writes that the nature of whiteness in the multicultural
post-civil rights context is precisely this, a blind spot and an absent signifier.35 For Altman, the absence
of an explicitly articulated white identity (in the wake of cultural shifts and civil rights legislation) has
relegated whiteness to an unconscious position in the mind of the modern subject, and thus a default or
normative identity is always already racialized and taken to be whiteness. In this context, the identity of
a black or Muslim person is taken to be racialized while that of a white person is conceived as devoid of
race or particularity.36 In the pages to follow, where Breivik and Rodger are taken to be referring to
white identity or white nationalist concepts in case where they do not do so explicitly, it is under the observation of this theoretical principle. Another important point is that these shifts in Western political
and cultural discourse come up explicitly in Breivik’s writing, and his ideology can be taken as an effort
to reassert a Norwegian/European/white identity as one carrying a unique history and particularity. As a
rule, it will be assumed that white and male identities are rarely explicated in mass media images and
narratives, and that to be examined it is necessary to draw them out using theories drawn from film and
media studies.
We now need to historicize the production of the mass shooting and show how today’s mass
shootings and other media events can be grasped from a perspective of world history. From John
Thompson, we took the idea that the selves and subjectivities of modern people have been increasingly
constructed in conversation with images and ideas taken from mass media. Not only that, media institutions have become increasingly concentrated under a few conglomerates, and spread their power and in-
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fluence globally. What this means for the purposes of world history is that the abovementioned processes of mediated communication have become intelligible on a global scale, and that California’s Elliot Rodger and Norway’s Anders Breivik developed their ideas, plans, and tactics in the same field of
mediated communication. This would not be the case in earlier historical epochs. We also considered
that the available field of symbolic content and images has become an increasingly global field, and that
mass shooters in different nations, for example, are integrated into the same discursive system in the
same way that academics in Japan and Argentina are increasingly in conversation with each other.
CHAPTER 1: ANDERS BREIVIK AND MEDIA DISCOURSE
In “Constructing Dark Celebrity”, Daniel Drageset argues that, as notorious criminals and murderers have achieved greater visibility in mass media, a sentiment has developed that committing a horrific
crime is a sure-fire way to “get famous” and achieve a certain degree of celebrity.37 Drageset then grafts
this model onto the case of Anders Breivik, and makes the claim that Breivik's 2011 attacks in Oslo and
on the island of Utoya were at least in some way motivated by a desire to “become famous”.38 Drageset's
basic contention that ensuing media coverage of the attacks was a motivating factor for Breivik is true
enough, but oversimplifies the case and stops too far too short. Rather than a simple cause and effect
scheme in which Breivik conducted a domestic terrorist attack to provoke attention from the mass media,
it is more useful to consider Breivik's attack as an effort to influence media discourse itself and deliver a
political message through the medium of mass violence. Breivik's attacks (and domestic terrorism itself)
are a form of communication in which he demonstrates a wide ranging symbolic vocabulary, or “televisual
discourse” and makes adept use of it in delivering an ideological message. Breivik's message, a right wing
white nationalist challenge to Norway's prevailing order of multicultural tolerance and gender equality,
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was delivered quickly and succinctly. Media coverage of the attacks both immediate and long term has
retooled and disseminated Breivik's message across several mediums, and ultimately legitimated his ideology as a genuine challenge to the European ideal. Many commentators and news clips decried the attack
as “an assault on the values Norwegians hold most dear”, which more than anything demonstrates the
efficacy of Breivik's project.39
Where Drageset fails is in if Breivik's attack was motivated by its potential media coverage solely
in terms of exposure and amount of coverage, as opposed to a delivery of a specific message through the
mass media itself. Drageset cites Breivik as stating that “being ignored is the worst thing that can happen”,
and being unconcerned with his demonization as a violent right wing extremist.40 Similarly, the day after
the attacks, Oslo police spokesman Roger Andresen was quoted in The Guardian that “he is clear on the
point that he wants to explain himself”, about Breivik.41 The notion of terrorism as communication is not
original to these pages, nor is it particularly novel in the field of media studies. Jeff Lewis, early in Language Wars, lays out his basic framework by quoting Brigitte Nacos in her assertion that communication
is the central factor in both terrorism and anti-terrorism, and that terrorism is best considered as an act of
communication. 42 Moving forward from these points, the question at hand is not only what message
Breivik was looking to get across, but also the symbolic vocabulary with which he delivered it, and the
extent to which mass media outlets aided or counteracted him in this pursuit.
To begin, we will consider what can generally be said to constitute Breivik's ideology. While
Breivik has changed his stance on numerous issues throughout his media career he was always opposed
to multiculturalism, Islam, feminism, immigration to Europe, and Marxism, and that he interpreted these
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oppositions via a populist and white nationalist lens.43 Breivik's manifesto, the best source for understanding his political beliefs at the time of his attacks, is a sprawling text of roughly 1500 pages which borrows
from numerous ideologies and thinkers, and attempts to cobble together numerous right wing tropes and
narratives into one unified system of ideas. Numerous passages are interpolated directly from Ted Kacynzski44, another mass killer, Norwegian right wing blogger “Fjordman”45, and numerous other right wing
commentators both mainstream and marginal are cited at length. The most important narrative arcs in the
manifesto are the revisionist historical narratives that explain modern European history from Breivik's
perspective, and cast the average native European (white) citizen as the political subject of his personal
ideology.46
The first element of Breivik's ideology is the “Frankfurt School conspiracy theory.” As the theory
goes, the Frankfurt School and other Marxist intellectuals in interwar Europe, sensing that a communist
revolution was a futile pursuit, decided instead to dismantle the Western world internally by destroying
traditional gender roles, pride in one's ethnicity, sexual morality, and other traditional or conservative
values47. While the attribution of changing cultural values about sexuality, gender, and race to a sinister
global conspiracy is in and of itself a narrative ploy that many right-wing thinkers would find appealing,
it is also important to note that the “Frankfurt School conspiracy theory” narrative also includes collusion
and support from global elites.48 Which is to say that, per this scheme, world leaders have made a concerted effort to apply the Frankfurt School's ideas and deconstruct Western culture. The idea of amoral
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societal elites betraying the interests of the common people appears again and again in Breivik's writing,
as well as in a great deal of far-right discourse online. It is also important to note the gender politics of
how Breivik interprets this theory. Throughout his writing, Breivik returns again and again to the theme
of the Norwegian welfare state and its gender discrimination policies as not only oppressive, but in many
ways, feminine. Breivik himself was raised by a single mother who held liberal political ideals, and wrote
in his manifesto that he had been feminized by her parenting style.49 Breivik was a product of Gro Harlem
Brundtland's Norway, in which sweeping reforms were passed which sought to raise the status of women
in society and support them in the home. The theme of resentment against a feminized society and political
leadership is an important theme in Breivik's thought, and would later come to inform his terror attacks.
Aage Borchgrevink, in A Norwegian Tragedy, recounts how Brundtland was the face of the Labor Party
in Breivik’s childhood, and explains how Breivik conceived of her as the “murderer of the nation”, a play
on her nickname “the mother of the nation”.50 Breivik’s view of Brundtland as an oppressive and evil
Freudian mother will reappear, so for now we will leave it at the assertion that Breivik’s gender politics
are intertwined with his understanding of history. Recalling Thompson, we can see the discursive links
between late 20th century Norwegian history and Breivik’s own experience.
The two most important terms in Breivik's ideology regarding this conspiracy theory are “political
correctness” and “Cultural Marxism”. Political correctness, as Breivik defines it, is the “General Line” of
the Western European establishment.51 The true source of political correctness, for Breivik, is the ideology
of Cultural Marxism, in which the standard dichotomy of workers and owners is applied in cultural terms
to women, homosexuals, racial minorities, the disabled, and so on. The “White Christian Male” is deemed
evil, and subverting traditional power dynamics is the top ideological priority10. Remember, Breivik also
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held that modern states and political leaders had participated in the spread and enforcement of this ideology, and that the effort to overturn and “deconstruct” traditional European values has been a concerted
effort by both militant far left forces and the state itself in modern Europe. Breivik's study of 20th century
academic leftism is remarkably wide ranging, and while he interprets the theories of Wilhelm Reich, for
example, in their binary opposition to “traditional European” sexual mores, his text does demonstrate a
basic understanding of Reich's ideas. At this point it is important to note that while these ideas appear in
Breivik's compendium, not everything in his manifesto is written by Breivik himself. The chapters on
Cultural Marxism are mostly lifted from the Free Congress Institute, a think tank founded by New Right
leader Paul Heydrich, mostly known for coining the term Moral Majority.52 Regarding Breivik, it's important to recall that he always functioned as much as a curator and arranger than he does an authentic
generator of ideas. Thus, his ideology was always intertextual, and his manifesto is as much a vanishing
point of various political ideas as it was a cohesive statement.
The second revisionist theory Breivik cites and embraces is significant in that it links his thought
to numerous other far right elements in the Western world. Breivik trades heavily in the Eurabia theory,
the idea that European civilization has been engaged in an existential struggle with the Islamic world for
centuries, and specifically interprets Muslim immigration to Europe as part of a concerted effort to colonize and subvert European civilization to Islam.53 The invasions of France by the Ummayad Caliphate and
Austria-Hungary by the Ottoman Empire are interpreted both literally and symbolically as an existential
threat to Europe, as is Muslim immigration to Europe. The link between the Eurabia theory and “Cultural
Marxism” is the notion that European political elites have deliberately encouraged and abetted widespread
Muslim migration to Europe to accelerate their overall project of the destruction of Western culture.54
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Indeed, Breivik's shooting on the island of Utoya was targeted at the youth wing of Norway's Labour
party, which had dominated Norwegian politics during the period in which Muslim immigrants began to
arrive in Norway en masse. Recalling Breivik's gendered interpretation of the Norwegian political class
and its activities, we now introduce the relationship between the virile and uncivilized masculinity Breivik
perceives in Muslim immigrant men (and the Muslim world itself), and the feminine attributes he attributes
to the Norwegian state. In combination with the common trope of the “Rape of Europa”, we can begin to
discern a narrative structure in which there is a metaphorical sexual relationship between the feminized
and supine West and the threatening and sexually aggressive Muslim East.55 Breivik interprets immigration policies and multiculturalism via this lens. In short, Breivik concludes that reasonable opposition to
Muslim immigration and discussion of the cultural incompatibility of Muslim immigrants and their host
countries is suffocated by the discourse of “political correctness” and multiculturalism. While Breivik's
compendium contains a huge range of ideas and narratives, the principal enemy he identifies is European
elites and their efforts to undermine European civilization and its values.
One of the most telling passages in Breivik's manifesto is that in which he explains his relationship
with masculinity. On page 732, Breivik remarks that “When I was younger and a lot more ignorant I used
to ask myself this very question about Europeans. What’s wrong with us, what’s wrong with the European
modern man? Why doesn’t he rise up against the multiculturalist elites and at least attempt to inflict some
damage or contribute to seize power on behalf of himself, his family and his people? Many state leaders
around the world are puzzled over how little resistance the European elites are getting in their attempts to
completely demographically reshape Europe.”56 Breivik concludes that the discourse of political correctness has been internalized by most men across Europe and left them defenseless not only against the
activities of their societal elites but also against the various crimes and abuses of Muslim immigrants in
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Europe. It is also important to note that Breivik almost always uses “European” or “native/indigenous
European” instead of “white” in his description of the besieged Norwegian population. If there were time
we could split hairs about the distinction, but for now we will suffice it to say that white identity is one of
the hidden kernels of Breivik’s political ideology. In any case, this was the point at which Breivik's narrative moved to the trope of a long abused and subordinated white man reasserting his masculinity and
control of his reality through acts of violence.
This is a narrative device with a wide range of expressions and retelling in Western mass media,
specifically in American cinema. Recalling our theory of the global intertextuality of mass media, we can
see how concepts from an American film of the 1970s can be assumed to in some way to have cycle
through popular culture, echoing into the 2011 attacks in Norway. The most readily accessible example is
Martin Scorsese's “Taxi Driver”, in which a seemingly anonymous taxicab driver takes it upon himself to
rid 1970s New York of corruption and social decay, culminating in a gun battle in a house of prostitution
in which he rescues a young girl from sexual exploitation and becomes a national hero. The plot of the
film is remarkably like Breivik's narrative, most notably the role of societal elites in propagating and
abetting social decay and a single man's duty to right their wrongs through extreme violence. Sabine
Haenni writes in Journal of Film and Video that the larger subtext of “Taxi Driver” is a decaying American
metropolis in which the heterosexual white male is no longer the dominant force in his reality and finds
himself struggling to assert any kind of identity in his new context.57 Scorsese's Travis Bickle returns
himself to prestige and dominance through his shootout with a young girl's sexual exploiters, but only
after a failed attempt to assassinate a senator. This is an important point, the notion of violence against
both the “high” and “low” elements of society, as compared with Breivik's contempt for both Norway's
political leaders and its “slum dwelling” Muslim immigrants.
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In both cases, the heterosexual white male subject is beset on all sides both by corrupt elites and
brutish social outsiders, and emerges from said bondage through an act of violence. Breivik's narrative is
also remarkably like D-FENS in “Falling Down”, the protagonists of “Fight Club”, Neo in “The Matrix”,
and other narratives from American cinema, but in the interest of space we will simply conclude that
tropes from American cinema and other mass media can reasonably be assumed to form part of Breivik's
symbolic vocabulary. Another key theme in both Taxi Driver and Breivik’s writing is sexual rejection in
favor of a racialized other. In “Taxi Driver” Robert DeNiro attempts to “rescue” a young girl who rejects
his attempt to do so, much like Breivik perceived himself as erotically rejected by the Norwegian state
and modern Norway overall. There is also a clear link here with Rodger, who of course identified his own
feelings of sexual rejection as the motivation for his attacks. D-FENS’s wife in “Falling Down” has also
left him, showing that gun violence as a white and male response to unrequited sexual and romantic feelings is an image which has echoed through Western mass media for decades.
The first attack Anders orchestrated was the detonation of a car bomb on a street in Oslo housing
numerous government offices, including the office of the Prime Minister. Jens Stoltenberg, Norway's
Prime Minister at the time, is an object of derision in much of Breivik's writing, as is the Labour Party as
a whole.58 The metaphorical significance of bombing government buildings is hardly difficult to decipher,
but his next move has been the subject of much more debate and analysis. After the bombing, Breivik
boarded a ferry to the island of Utoya disguised as a police officer, beckoned several members of the
Labour Party's youth wing over to himself, and then began firing indiscriminately. In the ensuing attack,
Breivik managed to kill 69 people, and injure 110.59 The attack was symbolically significant for numerous
reasons. For one, the Workers' Youth League held its annual summer retreat on Utoya every year, and for
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many Norwegians this was emblematic of the values of democracy, tolerance, and openness that characterized their nation and its self-concept. For Breivik, the retreat was emblematic of “Cultural Marxist”
elites and their efforts to destroy European civilization.
Here, it is important to note Breivik's deliberate decision to attack a gathering of the Labour party's
youth wing at their yearly summer retreat, as opposed to a gathering of party officials. The choice to kill
such young people in such great numbers was understandably shocking to both national and global audiences. Aage Borchgrevink quotes Breivik as saying that the attack was “cruel but necessary”, and that it
was better to kill too many people rather than too few to ensure a strong ideological impact.60 Breivik is
also quoted as saying that “morality” had lost meaning in the struggle for European civilization, and that
the more basic question of death or survival had more meaning in his context. In short, while Breivik
himself seems to have abandoned standard norms of morality, he clearly understood the significance of
“The Safest Place in Norway”, and had calculated the “ideological impact” of an assault on it.
For a theoretical precedent, we may recall in Critical Theories of Mass Media in which the authors
assert that the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks specifically utilized a symbolic vocabulary that American
audiences would understand, and that would fit within the image lexicon of American politics 61. In a
similar vein, Breivik attacked a site with deep metaphorical significance in Norwegian politics, and shot
dozens of minors to strike the vulnerable heart of what he considered to be the dominant force in Norwegian politics. What appears to be a cowardly action can also be interpreted as a symbolic gesture, and a
physical manifestation of Breivik's mission to challenge what he perceived as the dominant discourse of
European politics. Most importantly, we can observe here that Breivik’s attack displayed a highly proficient use of “televisual discourse”, and in a certain sense constituted an intentionally planned media event.
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Our next question is to what extent were the narratives in Breivik's ideology reflected in his actions,
and to what extent were his political views transmitted through his actions into mass media discourse?
The first place to begin is the immediate mass media coverage of the attacks. A Guardian article posted
the day after the attacks entitled “Norway Attacks: At Least 92 Killed in Oslo and Utøya Island” quotes
Prime Minister Stoltenberg as stating that Breivik had transformed a “paradise island” into a “hell”, and
that Norway did not have a major problem with right-wing extremists.62 First we can see that Breivik's
choice of a target had precisely the symbolic value he had hoped for, and that the ideological impact of
his attack was indeed as strong as he had hoped, given the Prime Minister's outraged reaction. In closing,
the article states that a friend of Breivik's had been quoted as saying he had “nationalistic views” and that
he was a critic of “the idea that people of different cultures can live together.”63 The more outraged a
reaction Breivik received from the press, the more his ideology could be interpreted as a threat to the
dominant discourse, and hence the stronger his cause appears. In “Utoya, the island paradise turned into
hell by Ander Breivik,” youth camp leader Eskil Pedersen is quoted as saying “We meet terror and violence with more democracy and will continue to fight against intolerance.”64 Certainly a heartfelt dedication to one's principles as they come under attack, but from the perspective of Breivik's ideology Pedersen's
statement is an acknowledgment of the fact that his attack represents a threat to Norway's dominant discourse, that of tolerance and democracy. In both cases, we can see that the media did Breivik’s work for
him on the basic matter of establishing his opposition to the dominant conception of “Norwegian values”.
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In “Norway attacks: Utøya gunman Boasted of Links to UK Far Right”, Breivik is quoted as speaking on his links to the English Defense League and other anti-Islam organizations in Europe, and is described as a “Christian fundamentalist.”65 Very telling is the discussion of Breivik's opinions on the tactics
of far-right groups in Europe and how he approved of their efforts to provoke strong reactions from their
political opponents. While it seems clear that media coverage of Breivik's attacks gave a wide berth of
exposure to his political views and associations, it is also worth considering the way that said coverage
could possibly be interpreted by someone sharing Breivik's ideology (or indeed, by Breivik himself). If
Breivik's ideology and his attacks are identified as a threat to liberal democracy, this makes his ideology
that much more powerful and legitimate in the mind of a person who identifies liberal democracy with
“Cultural Marxism”, “Political Correctness”, and “Eurabia”.
In “Constructing Dark Celebrity,” Dargeset notes that Hillel Nossek has theorized that national
media in the wake of a domestic terrorist attack typically plays the role of assuring the populace that the
attack does not represent an existential threat to the nation's way of life, and returning national moods to
normal66. It is also noted that the media runs the risk of “giving in” to the perpetrator or perpetrators of
the attack and not only spreading their message but also contributing to the climate of fear they sought to
promote. The media also runs the risk of emboldening people who ascribe to the ideology of the perpetrators, which may have seemed unlikely in 2011 but as right wing populist parties have made significant
inroads in Europe and anti-Muslim populist rhetoric has become increasingly popular in the United States,
a similar attack today would produce a very different media response.
Even in 2011, some right wing political commentators and leaders made remarks on Breivik's ideas
that were clearly outside the bounds of liberal democracy and its discourse. Francesco Speroni, a member
of Italy's right wing Lega Nord party, famously stated that Breivik's ideas were “in defense of Western
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civilization”, prompting a swift backlash amongst his own party.67 Another member of the Lega Nord,
Mario Borghezio, was quoted as saying the killings were possibly staged to discredit far right thinkers in
Europe, specifically those who embraced the “Eurabia” theory.24
What is most interesting about the question of whether Breivik's views are within the bounds of
“liberal democracy” is the question of why they remain intelligible and easily recognized despite their
supposed fringe status. What this should suggest to any reader is the fact that a reversal of any concept
will still follow and reproduce its internal logic, and that while Breivik may have chosen to be the “ultimate
villain” of 21st century Norway and Europe overall, he did so within its symbolic vocabulary, attacking a
government building and then striking at a highly vulnerable and symbolically important youth summer
camp for the Labor Party. Again, Breivik's attack was intelligible within the paradigms of Norwegian
politics the same way the 9/11 attacks were intelligible to their American audience. This suggests that
Breivik was fluent in the televisual discourse of modernity’s mediated world, and that his attack succeeded
as a communicative act. To return to Stuart Hall’s theory, Breivik’s attacks were encoded effectively.
In “Norway attacks: How Far Right Views Created Anders Behring Breivik”, Breivik's links to
far-right ideologies and groups were covered. Linking a far-right terrorist to far-right parties is a predictable rhetorical device, but at the end of the article is a highly important passage. The article cites nameless
“experts” as claiming that Breivik is neither a lone wolf nor insane, and that Europe ignores his ideas and
possibly similar actors at its own peril68. Breivik famously said that one purpose of his attacks was to
inspire other “European patriots”, so this is an excellent example of Breivik's message and ideology transmitted directly into mass media via his actions.

67

J Hooper, “Ex-Berlusconi minister defends Anders Behring Breivik”. The Guardian. July 27, 2011.

68

P Beaumont, “Norway attacks: At least 92 killed in Oslo and Utøya island”. The Guardian July 23, 2011.

33
Media coverage of the attacks in some ways resisted his narrative, and in other ways devolved into
a Rorschach test (every political group predictably found a way to blame their opponents for it). Ultimately, Breivik demonstrated an adept knowledge of political and cultural symbols and managed to make
a specific point of far-right populism as a challenge to liberal democracy. Following that Breivik's attacks
became a Rorschach Test in which different interest groups and thinkers found the ideas of their adversaries reflected in the attack and blamed misogyny, Islamophobia, “madness”, or other factors. This is the
strongest evidence for the attack's communicative intelligibility. Breivik successfully encoded the various
cultural antagonisms in his thought into the attack, and these antagonisms were reproduced in mass media
coverage of the shooting and bombing, letting feminists and multiculturalists know that they were under
attack. By a deft employment of the code of 21st century European politics, Breivik delivered a violent far
right challenge to what he perceived as multiculturalist hegemony and the forces which he saw as his
prime antagonists. Returning to Stuart Hall's theories of encoding and decoding, we consider the narrative
of Breivik's attacks as a “threat to liberal democracy and Norwegian values”69 as the dominant/hegemonic
position, the various interest groups viewing the attack as directed at them as a serious of negotiated positions, and people with far-right views consuming the media coverage as an oppositional position. It is
telling to consider a reversal of this scheme, considering the oppositional position of Breivik's far right
audience as a dominant reading of the attack itself as filtered through mass media outlets. Again, while
Breivik's attack is an inversion of mainstream Norwegian values, it follows the same internal logic and is
intelligible within its paradigm.
One common trope regarding Breivik is the question of his possible mental illness, which is an
effort to remove him from political discourse and deprive his 2011 attacks of their meaning as political
speech. There exists a wide range of research on the concept of mental illness as an incompatibility in
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systems of meaning between an individual and their society, but the characterization of Breivik as a “paranoid schizophrenic” seems odd in that the level of planning necessary to carry out his attacks seems
highly implausible for a person with serious mental illness, and beyond that it appears that Breivik clearly
understands modern Europe's systems of meaning as clearly as he rejects them, as evidenced by how many
of his ideas were directly reflected in mass media in the wake of his attacks. Most damningly, Breivik's
ideas and actions are intelligible within the paradigms of his society. Breivik's attacks can be demonstrated
to be meaningful communication, and the extent to which media discourse has reproduced his message
and spread his name and ideas across the globe shows the extent to which he was successful. The United
States has experienced not only mass shootings which are thematically and rhetorically like the 2011
Utoya shootings, but also mass shooters who have directly named Breivik as an influence.
If anything is clear, it is that Breivik has had very few political positions that cannot be identified
within the broad spectrum of the European right, and that while many right-wing populists eschew an
explicit Frankfurt School conspiracy theory, the idea of elites forcing a social agenda as well as immigration on a homogenous national subject is even less of a fringe idea in 2016 as it was in 2011. The heavy
media coverage of Breivik's attack is not only due to it having happened in Norway and the high death
toll, but also the extent to which Breivik seized on the symbolic vocabulary of mass media.
CHAPTER 2: ANDERS BREIVIK’S ATTACKS ON OSLO AND UTOYA
Breivik’s political positions being what they are, it remains to be demonstrated how he sought to
articulate them to the world. Here, we will contend with these questions. In The Dynamics of a Terrorist
Targeting Process, Cato Hemmingby and Tore Bjorgo use Ander's Breivik's 2011 attacks in Oslo and on
Utoya as a case study of how terrorists select their targets and plan their attacks. These notions are relevant to the questions at hand in that the execution of the attack and the concrete steps taken in Breivik's
acts constitute political speech to the same extent as his media activities. The process via which Breivik
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selected his targets and formulated his manifesto, rather than being the communicative aspect of his terrorist activities, can obscure the more immediately communicative aspect of the attacks themselves. The
real question at hand is at which point Breivik's political speech crossed over from text-based communication into communicative acts of violence, and what exactly caused this paradigm shift. These pages
will also demonstrate that, while Breivik's ideology changed over time, his communicative acts and efforts remained within the same basic paradigms of identity and violence in turn of the century Europe.
Through a textual and semiotic analysis of Breivik's activities, this chapter will uncover the narrative of
white masculine identity against a perceived feminine oppressor which defined Breivik's thought and
actions in 2011.
In Hemmingby's account, Breivik's original plans went deeply awry in the process of the attack.
Breivik planned to upload his manifesto and a video message and forward them to a series of media outlets,
which took longer than expected and fundamentally changed the symbolic value of his selected targets.
Breivik was also unable to detonate a fertilizer bomb in Oslo when it would have been most destructive,
and was unable to arrive on Utoya in time to assassinate former prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland.70
These logistical hurdles, while not fatal to the attack itself, significantly diminished the symbolic value of
Breivik's attack. Henceforth, the hiccups and setbacks in Breivik's communicative terrorist acts will be
understood as noise in his transmission. Hemmingby's account marks the time of the fertilizer bomb explosion as 3:25 PM, towards the end of the day on a Friday, when most government personnel were either
on holiday or had left for the day.71 While casualties were minimal, the symbolic value of destroying the
building and detonating a bomb in downtown Oslo at all was historically unprecedented in modern Norway. In Breivik's thought, the Norwegian state represented an oppressive “Cultural Marxist” hegemony,
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and the tower block where the bomb was detonated houses numerous important government buildings.72
By detonating a bomb in the heart of the Norwegian state, Breivik not only achieved the basic goal of
attacking the Norwegian government apparatus, but also demonstrated what he took to be the impotency
and feminine weakness of the Norwegian state in the face of an “Islamic invasion” and the perceived threat
of Muslim violence both in Norway's inner cities and in the guise of Islamist terrorism. Breivik’s bombing
attack made the point that other “European patriots” such as himself, more accurately referred to as white
nationalists in the American context, could quite easily mount attacks on the European security state.
The authors make the point that security at the site at the time was minimal, especially as compared
to a government building in another European city or in the United States.73 Earlier in the book, they make
the point that Breivik may have selected a Norwegian target because of the nation's comparatively minimal
counterterrorism infrastructure and low security even in its most core areas. This feeds back into Breivik's
indictment of the Norwegian state as insufficiently masculine. From a psychoanalytic perspective, we can
theorize that Breivik resented the fact that the Norwegian state was a “soft target”, viewing it in metaphorical terms as a soft maternal body. The modern welfare state has often been identified as a “nanny state”
in contrast to the paternal authoritarian states of the past, and as we will see later Breivik's lifelong angst
in his relationship with his mother is certainly a factor in his hate for the Norwegian state74. In terms of
the immediate response to the explosion, the police and security forces were so undermanned and unprepared for a terrorist attack that all their personnel and resources had to be immediately re-routed toward
grappling with the attack, a factor which allowed Breivik to escape and continue his activities75. Media
coverage of the Norwegian security state's impotence in the face of Breivik's attack plays into his narrative,
as does the global media's horror that such a thing could happen in modern Norway. Breivik set out to
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make the point that the Norwegian security state was weak and incompetent, which he achieved succinctly
in his bomb attack on it.
Breivik then drove to the land side of Utoya, and arrived at 4:26 PM. He was disguised as a police
officer, and upon his arrival explained to a Labour party official that he had been sent by the Oslo Police
Security Service to secure the island following the bombing attack.76 He was then ferried to the island,
during which he gathered information about the security arrangements at the camp. Most importantly, he
learned that an off-duty police officer was the main person in charge of security, and was introduced to
him upon arrival. The police officer became suspicious of Breivik, at which point Breivik suggested that
they proceed to the main headquarters of the camp to ascertain the parameters of the security situation77.
It was at this point that Breivik drew his firearm and fired a shot at the police officer.78 He proceeded to
spend the next 75 minutes walking across the island shooting everyone in his field of vision, indiscriminately except for a few extremely young camp-goers whose lives he spared due to their age. The authors
make the point that Breivik expected Labour Party members in their 20s, and was unprepared for the
comparatively younger age of most of the participants. This is yet another “unknown unknown” Breivik
faced during the attack. Breivik himself was in his 20s at the time, and the notion that he was anticipating
party members his own age suggests that he was looking to attack his peers. That he was confronted with
a group of juveniles instead can in some sense be taken as noise in his transmission, while at the same
time he later stated that the killing of juveniles was an act of maximum cruelty which was necessary to
make his point.79 In short, Breivik quickly retooled his own rhetorical strategy in response to his new
circumstances, and managed to keep his attack within the communicative framework he was working
from.
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The police response to the shooting was like the bombing in that the police were largely unprepared
and failed to apprehend Breivik or stop the attack until a much later point. Breivik himself made a call to
the police, identifying himself as the leader of the resistance to the Islamicization of Europe and a member
of the “Knights Templar.”80 The police also were under the impression that the attack was being executed
by multiple perpetrators, so even after Breivik was neutralized and apprehended they continued to search
for more terrorists. They did not in fact find more shooters, but found 70 slain victims and 33 more people
who sustained injuries in the shooting. Breivik was attempting to mislead the police and introduce noise
into their communications, but there may have been a deeper meaning to his claim that he was part of a
larger organization. Far-right parties have consistently existed in post-war Europe, and have historically
gone to great lengths to sanitize their rhetoric and conceal certain aspects of their activities due to strict
hate speech laws. Thus, the threat of a network of far-right terror cells carried and continues to carry a
certain existential dimension in modern Europe. Breivik wrote at numerous points that the aim of his attack
was to jump start an insurrection of far-right populists across Europe, and we can take his claim that such
a movement existed as an effort to create it by naming it81. The “Knights Templar” as he defines it appears
extensively in his manifesto, and it appears that he attempted to write it into existence. Whether future
mass shooters committing similar acts acted in concert with Breivik or not, after his claim that he was part
of a larger movement any other far right terrorist attacks in Europe could possibly be arranged into a
pattern by European mass media and linked to Breivik. Many commentators in fact did attach Breivik's
attack to far right populist parties and ideals in Europe, and did in fact suggest that his attack would be the
first of a series of such attacks. Once again, on this front Breivik's communicative act was successful. In
effect, European media coverage of the attack fell victim to Breivik's own narrative and allowed him to
coopt all right-wing terrorism in Europe under the auspice of his own personal mission. In short, for any
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terrorist attack to succeed in its mission, as an act of communication it must prove intelligible to mass
media audiences and/or the state.
Overall, the primary question for media commentators in the wake of such an atrocity has been
simply why someone would do such a thing. Since 2011, a body of literature has appeared which trace
Breivik's life retroactively from the attack itself. Some texts have located the causality for Breivik's turn
to terrorism in Breivik's own background himself, whereas others have located the blame entirely within
larger social and historical trends. The most successful and cogent arguments have of course synthesized
the two, and shown how the factors in Breivik's own biography coincided with his own historical reality
to produce the attacks as an outcome. If we consider Breivik not as an anomaly but as a subject whose
experience and ideas are historically conditioned, we see that his life is in many ways a microcosm of
several seismic shifts in the histories of Norway and Europe overall.
Anders Behring Breivik was born in Oslo in 1979 to Jens David Breivik, a civil engineer, and
Wenche Behring, a nurse. His parents divorced when he was a year old, at which point he and his mother
returned to Oslo from London where his father was stationed as a diplomat.82 Aside from the divorce,
which is a common outcome for families in modern Europe, we locate the first point of trouble in Breivik's
life at age 4, when his mother was under investigation by social services, and there was talk of his being
removed from her care.83 This was 1983, during the 5 years of Kare Willoch's Conservative government,
in which the Norwegian economy was deregulated, mass media especially. This becomes an important
factor later, in that more foreign media was available in the 1990s than in Norway’s past, and American
popular culture was thus more influential. Most accounts paint a picture of Breivik's mother as a very
troubled woman, and inappropriate behavior toward and in the proximity of the young Breivik appears
prominently in most descriptions of the period. The SSBU report is quoted as describing Wenche Behring
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as a very troubled woman with a borderline personality, and most tellingly asserts that she “projects her
primitive aggressive and sexual fantasies” onto the young Anders”84. Aage Borchgrevink is quoted as
saying that Breivik's mother saw him as a violent adult man, even though he was a four-year-old child.85
Borchgrevink suggests that young Anders was vilified and abused by his mother solely based on
his gender, and that she projected onto his sexed body her own troubled feelings about men and masculinity.86 Breivik would go on to write not only on the emasculation of European men, but also the extent
to which liberal feminist parenting had “feminised” him in adulthood.87 Returning to Breivik's identification of the Norwegian state with an oppressive maternal body, we cannot ignore that the bulk of his upbringing took place during the Gro Harlem Brundtland government, in a period in which sweeping social
reforms focused on supporting women both at work and in the home. Brundtland's tenure as Prime Minister was marked by historians as a seismic shift for gender roles in Norway, a shift which Breivik identifies as inextricably linked to his mother's abusive treatment of him when he was young.88 Breivik's experience of having violence and sexuality projected onto him solely due to his sex also contributed to his
own self-concept as a man, his difficulties interacting with women, and ultimately his stylized and highly
sensational conceptions of violence and sexuality. We can also see traces of these experiences in his manifesto, specifically where he deals with gender issues in the abstract and uses his mother and sister as case
studies.89
His mother's abuse may have shaped his sentiments on the modern Norwegian state, but this alone
is not the fulcrum of his choice to detonate a bomb in the heart of it. Theorists of communication make
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the point that communication depends on a cooperative principle, which states that two people must presume cooperation on each other's parts to meaningfully communicate. Not only did Breivik internalize an
entirely different system of signs than his peers in his early interactions with his mother, he also identified
his social setting as hostile and abusive to him. Hence, he perceived himself as unable to meaningfully
communicate with his society and his peers, and did not perceive a principle of cooperation to be in effect.
He assimilated to a different set of ideas than the official mainstream “mass line”, but still his thought and
expressions remain inside what is intelligible to other Norwegians and Europeans.
The next epistemic break in Breivik's development were his teen years, in which he became involved in hip hop youth culture and the practice of writing graffiti. Breivik associated with many youths
of immigrant backgrounds during this period, and adopted an image which he paradoxically would later
come to identify with the downfall of Europe and his personal antithesis. While it may seem contradictory
for a young man to identify with rap music and its signifiers and then come to embrace far right ideology,
as Aage Borchgrevink explains, the two worldviews served a very similar purpose in Breivik's life.90
Breivik's troubled relationship with his mother contributed to an antisocial personality and distrust of authority figures (specifically female ones, note his hate for Gro Harlem Brundtland), and both the “Kebab
Norwegian” and rap lyrics of his teen years and the far-right populism of his 20s place a heavy emphasis
not only on a direct challenge to social authority but also assertive masculinity and power. 91 Breivik,
throughout his writing, continuously associated Muslim immigrant youths in Norway with masculinity
and virility, in contrast with the “emasculation” of native European men.92 Hip hop culture in the 1990s
was also largely predicated on a notion of “youth in revolt” against society and its artifices. Rap music
and graffiti art are in many ways direct subversions of the conventions of “traditional” art and music.
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Much like terrorist attacks, however, rap lyrics and graffiti come to be interpreted within the paradigm of
the societies they attack, and are only intelligible to mainstream audiences and critics by their grounding
within these paradigms.
For example, for NWA's “Fuck tha Police” to shock and appall white listeners, the song must be
in some way intelligible to them in the first place. Breivik looked to rebel against the Norwegian social
order and his own feelings of emasculation and impotence via assuming the role of the virile and powerful
“Other”. While he of course rejected the ideas of his schoolteachers and the dominant political rhetoric of
1990s Norway, the concepts he used to develop his new identity came from that same society, and fit
within its paradigms.
Breivik adopted at least two such forms of subjectivity. While of course rap music and the writings
of Fjordmann are wildly different, as perceived and assimilated by Breivik they served largely the same
purpose. What is most important to note is that Breivik's political viewpoints and modes of self-expression
throughout his life never departed from the same symbolic lexicon. Norwegian manhood is identified with
emasculation and weakness, Muslim immigrants with masculinity and power, and the Norwegian state as
an oppressive and evil maternal body. Far right populist rhetoric and many rap songs, while they critique
it from two presumably different sides, always focus their ire on “the state”, “the system”, “our society”,
and the like. While Breivik certainly made different value judgments about immigrant youth in Oslo later
in his life, the set of attributes he ascribed to the three forces (Norwegians, immigrants, the state) remained
consistent.
The subject of graffiti is itself important to consider here in terms of its significance. Graffiti writers, especially in the period in which Breivik was active in the form, mostly seek to deface public property
or businesses with a specialized signature, or “tag”, which denotes their artistic skill.93 Public or difficult
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to access targets are highly prized, as is a highly intricate or unique piece. Graffiti as most commonly
understood was developed by black and Latino youth in 1960s New York, and is often associated with the
city's decline in the latter half of the 20th century. Grafitti is employed by “Taxi Driver” protagonist Travis
Bickle as an example of the social ills plaguing 1970s New York, which, as many scholars have pointed
out, are racially coded. Breivik's youthful identification with hip hop youth culture and later switch to
white supremacist views, while it does in some ways denote a reversal, demonstrates that he never left a
specific grammar of cultural images of identity and masculinity. Graffiti as an art form has been identified
by media and law enforcement as antisocial behavior which disrupts the visual and material order of a
normally functioning society.94 As Breivik identified Norwegian state and society with an oppressive maternal force, in his teen years it stands to reason that he would adopt a rhetorical closed fist against its
smoothly functioning hegemony.
It is important here to note the significance of graffiti art in the urban spaces of late 20th century
Europe, specifically its relationship with minority and immigrant youths, as well as the modern European
state. For this pursuit, we will consider the most primary of sources, Breivik himself. Breivik wrote, in an
imagined interview, about his involvement with graffiti and hip hop youth culture during his “vulnerable
years.” Breivik explained that it was easy for him to gain respect and notoriety in the hip hop community
in West Oslo, because it was the more privileged part of the city, with comparatively fewer immigrants,
and that in this crowd he was prominent.95 Breivik then moved on to explain that graffiti as an activity
was an open act of defiance of the Oslo city government, and Norwegian civil society and that the graffiti
scene had a high proximity to both far left political groups in Oslo (SOS Racisme and Blitz), and local
immigrant gangs as well.96 It is implied that these early experiences with far-left politics and immigrant
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youths in Oslo were important to Breivik's development, and he recounts that experiences with the hostility
of his friends to Norwegian culture and customs were formative with respect to his own feelings about
Norwegian culture and its importance.97 Breivik then explained a collusion he perceives between Marxist
organizations and Islamic gangs, links them to the organized gang rape of Norwegian women, and then
tacitly implies the complicity of the state in promoting policies that would produce these outcomes. He
also makes the point that native Norwegians who allied with each other to fight against these practices
were labeled “neo-Nazis” and subject to arrest and social persecution.98 While Breivik's explanations of
this period of his life may be marked by revisionism, the basic themes of his writing are clearly on display.
An emphasis on masculinity and a general air of antisocial behavior were clearly the main points of appeal
for Breivik, as far as graffiti was concerned. Breivik’s use of the term “native Norwegians” is important
here in that he is referring to whiteness, and it is important to note that he transitioned from an identity
center around masculinity and power but hostile to whiteness to an identity which centers both whiteness
and masculinity.
In his activities in the world of graffiti, Breivik displayed a willingness to attack “society” and
articulate his own subjectivity. In a sense, his graffiti pieces were early precursors to his later attacks on
what he perceived as the very same society. Lacking the language to express his subjectivity through the
institutions and discourses of Norway at the end of the 20th century (recall that the child welfare authorities
were unable to stop his mother's abuse toward him), Breivik subverted and attacked his perceived authorities via the material rhetoric of his graffiti.
Breivik's graffiti career, however, was to come to an end when he was caught by police and collaborated with them in exchange for leniency. The ostracizing he faced, in combination with increased
racial hostility in Oslo and a few high-profile cases of alleged sexual violence against Norwegian women
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and girls by youths of immigrant backgrounds, began to push him in a different direction.99An important
avenue to consider regarding graffiti in Oslo is its intersection with Oslo's developing gang culture in the
1990s. While certain modes of representation and ideas about street gang were exported to Norway via
American mass media, that does not mean that Oslo's gang culture was somehow less corporeally real, or
that it did not play an important role in young people's lives. Borchgrevink speaks of the advent of the
“Tasen Gang”, a group composed of youths from a predominantly white neighborhood in Oslo who developed a reputation for being “tougher than the immigrants.”100 and in some cases later gravitated toward
skinhead imagery and far right ideas. Rather than identifying masculinity with non-Norwegian identity
and antisociality again with immigrant youth gangs, Breivik was now given a model of masculinity which
asserted itself both against “Norwegian society” and immigrants themselves, in that it centered and emphasized whiteness. The Oslo of the 1990s is described by Borchgrevink as a context in which racial
animosities and rhetoric came to the fold in an unprecedented way, closely mirroring the racial angst of
90s America and Great Britain.101 Borchgrevink also details how West Oslo, historically white, saw an
influx of immigrant families and an expansion of its public housing, which contributed to the animus and
conflict amongst its young people.
It is also important to note how Breivik himself, as quoted by Borchgrevink, conceptualized 1990s
Oslo. For Breivik, the Oslo of the period was rife with violence, specifically sexual violence directed
against Norwegian women and girls by immigrant youths.102103 The metaphor of the rape of Norway as
projected onto the bodies of both Norwegian women and immigrant men, figures heavily not only into
Breivik's later ideological statements, but also appears in other national contexts across Europe. One need
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only look at media coverage of this and last years' migrant crises to notice a heavy emphasis on images of
sexual violence and concerns about its perpetration against native populations.
This is another moment in which Breivik's biography intersects with his historical moment, namely
an association of victimhood and weakness with femininity, and concerns over masculinity and national
identity. Breivik's Norwegian political class is either feminine or feminized, as contrasted with the Muslim
immigrant who is viewed as strong, virile, and dangerous. In Breivik's writing, the standard “top uses the
bottom against the middle” takes on a strongly gendered and racialized character, positing the political
subject as a white Christian Norwegian male beset on all sides. Breivik's concerns about his own masculinity are well documented, and it was reported that he underwent plastic surgery to make his chin appear
more “manly”, and used anabolic steroids in his weightlifting regimen to become more physically powerful.104 About his own childhood, Breivik wrote that he did not approve of the “super liberal” parenting
style, making the point that he felt it responsible for “feminizing” him105. Breivik’s thought is marked by
a complex matrix of ideas in which masculinity, race, and white identity combine in various permutations.
While the narratives may be coherent, there is one basic theme that can be identified.
Deeply contemplating his manifesto, we see that Breivik's writing began to suggest that a view of
the preferential treatment of immigrants by the Norwegian state relative to the Norwegian population as a
case of unrequited love. Breivik felt that the emasculated Norwegian man lacks some essential quality
embodied in the Muslim immigrants, and it is not too far of a leap to take his complaints about competing
with them for Norwegian women to imagine him competing with his imagined Muslim enemies for the
heart of the Norwegian mother-state itself.
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Regarding his relationships with women, biographers assert that he had difficulty with romantic
partners and interacting with women in social settings. At one point, he used a foreign dating service to
meet a woman from Belarus who came to Oslo to live with him for a time, though their relationship was
ultimately unsuccessful106. Personal accounts detail how Breivik's affect with women was constricted and
unusual, an echo of the child care workers and their concerns about 4-year-old Anders' constricted affect
and strange behavior. Breivik's difficulties with women, far from being the “root cause” for his motivations to commit a mass shooting, are symptomatic of the basic issues he felt he faced in his experience of
modern Norway. Namely, he found it difficult to adapt to the discourse of his environment and express
himself in a language others could understand. Breivik's personal writings in some cases attributed his
issues with women to the huge shift in Norwegian gender politics in the 1980s, and posited that things
between men and women were made difficult by a blurring of gender roles and expectations. In his manifesto, Breivik makes it a point to note the experiences of his mother and sister with STIs, attributing his
sister’s experience with pelvic inflammatory disease and that of his mother with genital herpes to their
supposed moral failures, again returning to shifting gender expectations in Norwegian history and feminine villainy as the root of Norway’s social problems.107
The “feminized” Norwegian (white) male, in the mind of Breivik, found himself unable to defend
Norwegian women against sexual violence perpetrated by Muslim immigrants, also experienced diminished sexual desirability by comparison.108 Breivik's attacks, as he has explained in media activities and
interviews, was an effort to jump start a movement by European patriots to fight back against multiculturalism and Islam, and in some senses, reassert a besieged European (white) masculinity.109 At this point,
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we must consider the dark possibility of a causal link in Breivik's mind between “the rape of Europa” and
the diminished sexual desirability of white men. Is it possible that Breivik suspected “Europa” of desiring
sexual violence from the Muslim other which he himself was not “man enough” to enact? As abhorrent as
this idea is, one need not stray too far into the more lurid corners of the internet to find frustrated men
discussing rape as “the natural sexual order”, and claiming that white women secretly fantasize about Arab
and African men's inherent power and virility. At this point, it is important to recall that, rather than the
ravings of a madman, these are all concepts which are intelligible within modern Western culture, and
appear in film and literature as well as political discourse. As abhorrent as his ideas and actions were, it
can never be forgotten that they exist within the abovementioned “code” of political and cultural symbolism.
Rather than conceiving of the mass shooting as the return of some repressed primordial urge, we
will take the focus away from sexual frustration and move it to a perceived failed effort to communicate,
followed by a perceived successful communicative act. If we return to the theories on terrorism as communication, we can see that failed communication and a turn to different mediums is a much more productive interpretation of the mass shooting than misdirected libidinal feelings. In the case of Anders
Breivik, we observe a series of epistemic ruptures in which his efforts to communicate with other people
ultimately failed and he embraced other mediums. Returning to the overarching rhetoric of the mass shooting as media event and its ancestors in film and literature, we see again and again a white male subject
who finds themselves unable to enter the discourse of their environment and looks to the physical rhetoric
of violence to assert themselves. Just as Travis Bickle is unable to understand or fit into a 1970s New York
in which whiteness and maleness is increasingly de-centered, Anders Breivik finds himself unable to
achieve his vision of the good life in the Norway of the 1990s. We also recall Travis Bickle's attempted
rescue of a teen girl from a life of prostitution, and the way she intitially rejects his savior's mission. Much
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like Breivik secretly suspects Europa of desiring its own rape at the hands of the Muslim Ummah, Travis
Bickle suspects Jodie Foster's character of wanting to be prostituted in a New York where white masculinity is increasingly de-centered. In both cases, a narrative of heterosexual relations pervades which focuses on male agency and fulfillment, and in their own way both men conclude their stories as heroes in
their own minds.
Accepting the premise that Breivik's attack can be interpreted as an act of communication, we are
still left with the question of where to locate the discursive point of departure from Breivik as “normal
person” and Breivik as “terrorist”. Rather than the factor which finally led to his radicalization, we will
consider the point at which he finally lacked the language to articulate his subjectivity by any means other
than an act of terrorism. Breivik must be read not only in terms of his biography, but also his historical
moment and the larger trends which inform his political views as well as his personal experience.
Returning to the earlier discussion of Kare Willoch’s tenure as Norway’s Prime Minister, we can
recall a series of important developments in Norway during Breivik’s childhood. Willoch was the leader
of Norway from 1981 to 1986, and the changes in Norwegian governance he and his party initiated not
only complicate predominating narratives about Norway, but also demonstrate a crucial missing link between American media and Anders Breivik’s terrorist attacks. First and foremost, Willoch was a lifelong
skeptic of Nordic social democratic policies, and was instrumental in their rollback in several cases. An
economist by trade, Willoch famously dissolved the state monopoly on telecommunications and other
media, a process of deregulation which not only greatly weakened the state’s ability to control media
content, but also allowed the proliferation of cable television for Norwegian families. This created a wide
difference between Norway and its Scandinavian neighbors regarding commercially produced content,
and given the domination of American film and television globally, meant that Norwegian consumers had
more access to American media than Swedes, for example. Curiously, rather than falling under the global
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communications regime by default, it appears that Norway’s mass media infrastructure was integrated
with that of the United States as far back as the 1980s, meaning that Anders Breivik was given similar
referents to his American counterparts because of this historical development. In his adolescence, Breivik
could very easily have seen the American film “Robocop” on television when his Swedish neighbors could
not. Considering these facts, it cannot be a coincidence that a nation with such a great integration with
American telecommunications could produce an American style mass shooting. Returning to Thompson’s
arguments on how the modern subject constructs their subjectivity from the building blocks they glean
from mass media. Considering the prominent role of gun violence in American media and Norway’s early
integration with American mass media, we can conclude that gun violence as a symbol entered Breivik’s
consciousness early on. Breivik is a case where a somewhat common experience (issues with women,
anxieties about race and power) becomes integrated into a global mass media discourse of white male
identity.
Another key element of Willoch’s tenure as Norway’s leader is the introduction of market-oriented
economic reforms and an end to government intervention in credit markets. Along with concerns about
immigration and cultural identity, many scholars have identified these neoliberal reforms as a major fulcrum of the rising popularity of right wing populist parties in Norway and elsewhere in Scandinavia. Bjorn
Fryklund claims that as a rule, populist parties arise in conditions where sections of the population feel
slighted by political elites. Fryklund’s research shows that the Progress Party, to which Breivik had briefly
belonged, saw its popularity increase from 14.9% to 22.6% in Norwegian parliamentary elections between
2001 and 2005.110 Magnus E. Marsdal explains the social composition of the Progress Party and notes
that, rather than being a party of dispossessed workers, as the narrative about right wing European parties
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goes, the Progress Party can be much more accurately described as a party of private sector workers.111
For context, we recall that the public sector employs a greater percentage of all workers in Norway than
in the United States, and hence the voting patterns common to public sector workers in the United States
can be somewhat observed in Norway to a much greater degree historically. However, Kare Willoch’s
deregulation of the Norwegian economy and subsequent expansion of the private sector meant that increased popularity for the Progress Party has a clear historical context. Somewhat paradoxically, we can
see enthusiasm for free market ideals combined derision for their outcomes (immigration, a diminished
social safety net, a renegotiated ethno-national identity) forming an important core of Norwegian populist
ideology. Controlling for questions of degree, tactics, sophistication, and the like, we can firmly situate
Breivik’s ideas within this context.
The dominance of the Labor Party in Norway over the course of several decades and far reaching
shifts in both culture and policy created a relatively homogenous self-concept in Norway.112 Not only that,
a specific model of multiculturalist ideology and immigration policy has been dominant in Norwegian
politics since the 1990s, and Labor Party officials had been working on promoting a new Norwegian selfconcept which included immigrants and refugees.113In this context, right wing populist parties have become the predominant visible force with a political rhetoric which challenges mainstream European multiculturalism, and elites both in the EU and national governments have struggled to shake the association
of multiculturalism with the agendas of political elites.114 Multiculturalism has also been tied to globalization and increased flow of capital between the global core and periphery, which has created a supposed
link between economic inequality and multiculturalist ideas which the European establishment has also
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been hard pressed to shake when criticized by right populist parties. Indeed, immigrants primarily came
to Norway to fill a need for labor, until the government stopped issuing work visas in 1975.115
Social elites have been accused of using immigrants to lower the wages of native (re: white) workers, and refugees often cannot legally work, which opens proponents of asylum policies to the criticism
that they import “Labour voters” and people who do not contribute to Norwegian or European societies
more broadly. Noting that persons of immigrant background are represented heavily in the Labour Party’s
leadership and voter base, this is point can only be debated from a perspective of causation. In an age of
increased austerity, social instability, terrorism, and in some ways, a rollback of what European citizens
identify as the core aspects of their societies, right wing populist parties and ideologies have seized the
difficulties faced by middle class Europeans and project them onto the cultural sphere. Most major European nations have seen right wing parties making large inroads in their elections, in some cases paradoxically running on the platforms one would expect from the European left. Social protections, environmental policy, opposition to austerity, an end to NATO treaty obligations, withdrawal from the War on Terror,
and opposition to global free trade are common positions for the new right populist parties. Some scholars
have even remarked that by abandoning many of their key positions in a pursuit to ally themselves with
global finance and business in the wake of the cold war, many of the European labor and left parties have
effectively handed many of their key positions to right wing populist parties.
This of course is not to say that right wing populist rhetoric or violence is somehow a “natural”
outcome of a monadic neoliberal hegemony, or that European citizens have some latent predisposition to
fascism, or that a young man unable to integrate into his social reality will “naturally” commit an act of
mass violence in response to his difficulties. Returning to John Thompson's Media and Modernity, we
recall that the modern subject has a limited array of images and concepts available in the construction of
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their own identity, and that the images and concepts which proliferate most readily in mass media will
serve as the building blocks for the subjectivity of the average person. This is to say that rather than positing neoliberal ideology and policy and right wing populist nationalism as the only two options for 21 st
century European politics, we accept that they are the two main models available in mass media to the
European subject. Beyond that, the two ideologies can be seen to constitute a complementary and cohesive
whole, rather than being opposites.
Much like a well-adjusted happy life as a heterosexual middle class man and a vengeful domestic
terrorist were not the only two directions in which Anders Breivik could have seen his life go in, these
were the two options he perceived most readily in his media consumption, even in very murky terms or
via chains of referent images and signifiers. Without a healthy language or ideological platform with which
to critique his experiences and personal troubles, he resorted to the language of ultimate subversion and
transgression in 2011 Norway, a domestic terrorist attack. In his court proceedings Breivik named himself
“the worst monster since Quisling”, and in some ways, his attack can be read as a tragic and abhorrent
continuation of his juvenile graffiti career, the ultimate antisocial transgression. More than anything, we
must recall that his attack and his ideas were ultimately intelligible, and fit within the code or discourse of
21st century Norway and Europe. As many of his ideas were reproduced in the media coverage of his
attacks, his programme was meaningfully decoded and reproduced. While Breivik's attack shocked and
appalled us, it remained within the rhetorical paradigm of Western society. The signifiers of whiteness,
masculinity, power, and violence were readily identifiable by the mass media, and as such he accomplished
the exact rhetorical effect he set out to.
CHAPTER 3: PERSONAL AND POLITICAL IN THE RHETORIC OF ELLIOT RODGER
Three years later, on the other side of the Atlantic, Breivik’s attacks repeated themselves in Isla Vista,
California. On May 23rd, 2014, Elliot Rodger stabbed three men to death in his apartment, uploaded a
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video to YouTube describing his views on women and the modern world, emailed a personal memoir
and manifesto to around ten people, drove to a sorority house and shot three people. He then drove to a
deli and shot a diner, and then led police on a chase through Isla Vista California shooting and hitting
passerby, before taking his own life by gunshot in his parked BMW. Like many horrific and seemingly
random acts of violence in the 21st century, the media has heavily dissected and debated the significance
of the event and its causation. Anti-gun political commentators discussed lax gun laws as the root of the
issue116, feminists labeled misogyny the basis of Rodger's motivations117, leftists alleged that Rodger
carried right wing views, and even some conservatives located leftism at the root of Rodger's
misanthropy.118
One particularly crass explanation is the “Killer Virgin” narrative put forward by the New York
Post. On most of if not all coverage of the shooting on the New York Post's website, Rodger is referred
to as “Killer Virgin Elliot Rodger” or simply “Killer Virgin”, the implication being that Rodger's sexual
frustration was the true cause for his crimes.119 This trope appeared in media coverage of mass shootings
in the United States, complete with implications that repressed libidinal urges somehow exploded from
these young men as a burst of violence. Rodger's difficulty to form relationships with women is not the
root cause of his ideology or his attacks. If we collapse the distinction between a mass shooting and a
domestic terrorist attack (for this, we need only collapse the distinction between the personal and
political sphere), we can then apply our communicative theory of terrorism to the Rodger case and show
that discourse and communication lie at the heart of the matter. Simply put, while misogyny and
Rodger’s mental illness were both important factors in his attacks, these issues were what he sought to
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communicate via an act of violence. Much like Breivik’s attacks and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Rodger’s
acts can be construed as communicative within a global field of ideas and symbols.
Rodger prepared to conduct his attack by purchasing handguns, training himself in their use, and
ruminating on which potential targets carried the most symbolic value.120 Much like other domestic
terrorists and mass shooters, his actual attack fell short of its projected goals, and in the end involved as
much improvisation as adherence to a plan. In comparison with Breivik’s 2011 attacks, we can perceive
a much greater degree of noise in Rodger’s broadcast and a diminished degree of preparation. This can
in some ways be attributed to the age difference between the two young men, as well as the fact that
Breivik prepared for a longer period.
As opposed to attacks that involve bombings or assaults on public or governmental structures,
Rodger's operation required only the two handguns in his possession and a motor vehicle. The plan
involved stabbing his housemates and their friend to death, an attack on a specific sorority which Rodger
deemed had “the hottest girls” as members, and ended with Rodger's suicide via both drug overdose and
a self-inflicted gunshot.121 Rodger was successful in killing the 3 men in his apartment, but unsuccessful
in entering the sorority house, which derailed his plan and narrative. What we can observe from
Rodger's failure to “shoot up” the sorority is that when his plan failed, the event devolved into wanton
violence. Rodger does not appear to have had a contingency plan, which slightly neutered the symbolic
reverberations of the attack in its mass media coverage. Rodger's attack did not quite hit all the signifiers
he planned for, which equates to his attack being a less successful discursive act than the Columbine
shootings or the 9/11 attacks, for example. This effect, in combination with the less sophisticated and
composed nature of Rodger's manifesto, necessitates that scholars looking for historical or cultural
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significance regarding Rodger's attacks look a bit deeper beneath the surface.
In the wake of the shooting, media reports stated that Rodger's friends and family had been
increasingly concerned about his behavior and statements, to the point where his mother asked Isla Vista
police to conduct a “wellness check” on him at home in the weeks leading up to the shootings.122 Rodger
himself discussed in his manifesto a period of testing the waters with his friends and family and their
generally negative responses to the feelings he expressed.123 This is consistent with Rodger's account of
his efforts to share some of his other interests and viewpoints with the people close to him, as well as his
apparent inability to communicate his emotions or experiences to his friends and family.
At this point it is important to note that Elliot Rodger, per his father's attorney, had been
diagnosed with a high functioning case of Asperger's syndrome as a child, though the attorney walked
back this statement a day later.124 The Santa Barbara Sherriff’s Department also reported that Rodger
had been diagnosed with “Pervasive Development Disorder”, and that he had been treated with Prozac
and alprazolam since his mid-teens for his social difficulties125. Discussing the violent rhetoric of an
individual diagnosed with Asperger's syndrome and attributing it to “discursive failures” is certainly
dangerous ground, so the following clarification is necessary. Persons with mental illnesses or other
related difficulties are in no way more likely to commit acts of violence, nor is the mass shooting a
logical outcome of Asperger's syndrome any more than it is a logical outcome of sexual frustration. Both
narratives individualize cultural problems with historical contexts, and project violence and social
transgression onto individuals. By centering the discussion of Rodger on the “Killer Virgin” narrative or
focusing on his Asperger's diagnosis, mass media coverage projects the causation of his attacks onto the
ways he is different from the norm, as opposed to the structural and cultural forces that could produce
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such an outcome. While the writings and actions of Elliot Rodger do in fact suggest some degree of
mental illness, there is a difference between “mental illness” and “madness”, and the distinction in
Rodger’s case is just as vital as it is in Breivik’s.
Michel Foucault located the evolving definition of madness within the development of “reason”
as an organizing principle of modern societies.126 The relationship between madness and communication
is an important fulcrum of Foucault’s argument, in which he claims that the “madman” and the “lunatic”
were confined not only physically but also cordoned off from the discourses of their societies, a pattern
that continues into the modern world. Considering Breivik and Rodger, we can see an effort in the media
to cordon off their ideas, one which ultimately has the opposite effect of disseminating the precise
ideological content of their attacks to larger and larger audiences. Not only that, we see that boiling
down the attacks to mental illness is a fatal error because both men produced media materials which are
entirely intelligible within modern Western discourses, and to that affect, their attacks themselves are
highly intelligible.
Elliot Rodger was born in 1991 to Peter Rodger, a filmmaker, and Li-Chin Rodger, a research
assistant in the film industry, and much like Breivik was born in London before moving away at a young
age. He lived with his parents in London until he was 5, at which point the family moved to California
so his parents could pursue their film careers.127 Rodger's parents divorced before he turned 10, and
while his mother remained single, his father remarried and fathered a child with his second wife.128
Rodger described tension with his father's new wife in his memoirs, and noted that he was unable to
emulate his father's success with women, and that his father's inability to empathize with his personal
challenges caused a rift between the two of them. Rodger's relationship with his mother was similarly
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troubled, mostly stemming from a perceived failure on her part to achieve a certain level of material
success, a major focus for Rodger and large component of his self-concept.
Regarding psychiatric treatments, Rodger had been treated by various mental health
professionals from when he was 8 years old, ranging from psychiatrists to peer counselors. The issues
for which he was treated included depression, issues forming relationships with women, social isolation,
and low self-esteem. At one point, he was prescribed the antipsychotic drug Risperidone, but largely
refused to take it129. He also reportedly rejected most of the psychiatric counseling he was offered and
declined to take the advice and counsel of his friends and family. We will move to his own personal
rhetoric concerning his psychiatric treatments in the following pages, but suffice it to say for now that
Rodger did not accept that a change of perspective could significantly change the outcomes in his
personal life. After graduating high school, he attended two different community colleges in Southern
California, living with either his mother or father depending on the status of his relationship with either
parent. In June of 2011, Rodger moved to Santa Barbara to attend Santa Barbara City College.130 Not
only was this a change of scenery academically, he was also living on his own with housemates for the
first time.
As troubled as his family relationships were, the move to Santa Barbara was clearly a major
negative turning point in Rodger's personal trajectory. As he wrote in his memoirs, it was his move to
Santa Barbara which brought him to the conclusion that his “Day of Retribution” was a necessary and
inevitable outcome to his life.131 This raises the question, what about his experience in Santa Barbara
was so negative, and what events pushed him to feel that he could only articulate himself to the world
via violence? To contend with this question, we should locate Rodger within a series of historical
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continuities.
First, we place Rodger within the histories of “geek” culture and the “alternative right”. On the
corners of the internet where Rodger was commonly found, there is a documented prevalence and
emphasis on political ideas which are purported to be “fringe” and “revolutionary”132. Eugenics, a
rejection of racial and gender egalitarianism, a rejection of democracy, homophobia, anti-semitism, and
other taboo opinions are openly expressed and promoted.133 The curious thing about today’s
“neoreactionary” ideology is that it so perfectly inverts mainstream political discourse in the United
States.134 For example, it is a mainstream opinion in American discourse today that race is a social
construct and that no basic differences exist between a white and black person on a biological basis. In
the alternative right movement, however, racial differences in IQ for example exist along biological lines
and can be explained via anthropology.135 The reason that alternative right ideas are so readily
intelligible and resonant, such as those tacitly embraced by PayPal founder Peter Thiel and to some
extent 2016 presidential candidate Donald Trump, is that they perfectly invert mainstream opinions and
thus follow the same grammar and internal logic. Thus, the incendiary rhetoric of a Vox Day or a Milo
Yiannopoulos does not stand on its own as an outside critique or attack on mainstream American ideas.
In fact, it forms only one half of a cohesive and mutually complementary system. It is within this field of
ideas that Rodger developed his ideology, which has been reflected within his huge popularity in its
circles after his attack and death.
Numerous factors can be identified in the evolution of what we now call the “alternative right”.
The most obvious factor is the proliferation of the internet, which is not only almost entirely deregulated
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but also facilitates wide scale communication instantaneously beyond national borders. Internet users
also have the option to communicate anonymously, which creates spaces where inflammatory or
controversial opinions can be discussed freely.136 Most importantly, ideas are circulated without being
beholden to the whims of mass media conglomerates or the state. For many historians and media
commentators, the first example of the internet’s role in political discourse was in 1998 when Bill
Clinton’s affair scandal first broke on “The Drudge Report”, a website on which California journalist
Matt Drudge posted controversial and little known news reports.137 There is a wide and rich literature
about misogyny on the internet, and the extent to which women find themselves unsafe online. In
Cybersexism: Sex, Gender, and Power on the Internet, journalist Laurie Penny considers misogyny
online from an autobiographical perspective, and most crucially explains how a certain “no rules” antiauthoritarian culture in internet communities has created an atmosphere where “offensive” ideas and
images can circulate.138 However, the most transgressive and shocking internet posts are still within
mainstream discourse in that they are intelligible within it.
This was the first example of a strain of right wing media activities existing online outside the
realm of censors or organized political groups, and the trend continued when Andrew Breitbart founded
his own eponymous website, famed for its expose of ACORN, ending the career of USDA official
Shirley Sherrod, and other media activities. Breitbart himself had studied the mass media theories of the
Frankfurt School during his years at Tulane University, which suggests that his understanding of mass
media was ironically influenced by Marxist thinkers. The late Breitbart’s website is now “the platform
for the alt right”, and was one of the largest sources of media support for Donald Trump’s campaign.139
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There is a long-standing relationship between internet discourse and right wing politics in the United
States, which accounts for the widely divergent and extensively trafficked array of websites which
Rodger used to construct his own views on race, gender, and politics. The report by the Santa Barbara
Sheriff’s Department details that when they looked at Rodger’s laptop, they found that he had made
multiple searches pertaining to not only knives and violence, but also numerous topics related to Nazism
and Adolf Hitler.140 The search of the laptop also showed that Rodger had accessed PUAHate.com and a
bodybuilding website. The media also reported on his online footprint in the wake of the attacks, noting
that his internet activities were in many cases highly disturbing and objectionable.141 Historically, we
can ground Elliot Rodger’s attacks within a larger contemporary historical trend of objectionable,
shocking”, and vulgar developments in 21st century America.
Rodger participated in online discussions about sexual relationships, often commenting that he felt
jealous when he saw men of Asian or African-American background with white women, and felt himself
more deserving of their attention.142 This echoes the passage in his manifesto where he describes being
angered by a black acquaintance’s story of losing his virginity. Rodger himself noted that he was “halfwhite and descended from British aristocracy” while the other young man is “the descendant of slaves”143.
There are numerous instances in which Rodger finds himself quarreling with other young men who he
deems “low class”, “brutes”, and typically inferior to him on a basis of race or social class144. This can be
compared with Breivik’s manifesto, in which he identifies the Muslim youths of Oslo with a powerful
virility and masculinity, and “the Norwegian male” as feminized and weak. Miscegenation has a long
history in American identity politics, and has long been a chief concern of the “paleoconservatives” who
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are often credited as the forefathers of today’s alternative right movement. The late Samuel T. Francis
wrote extensively on right wing website VDARE about miscegenation and its supposed evils, and many
of his 1980s and 1990s writings on race can be seen reflected in today’s discourse145. Rodger existed
within a fully developed political movement, one which to some extent has its mouthpiece in a major
American presidential candidate.146
Elliot Rodger’s media consumption also informed his life and ideas. On page 61 of his
manifesto, Rodger wrote that he was deeply affected by the film Alpha Dog, and notes that he was
envious of one of the main characters, despite the character being murdered in the end of the film.147 For
a brief overview, the plot of the film centers on the real-life kidnapping and murder of Nicholas
Markowitz in 2000. Markowitz was abducted and killed in a complex scenario involving a drug debt,
and the film revolves around images of masculinity, power, and violence. What Rodger was struck most
by was the part of the movie where Markowitz's abductors are depicted taking him to a series of raucous
parties in the Los Angeles area in which he drinks, uses drugs, and has sex with women. Rodger writes
that he was deeply moved by this imagery, and began to associate Santa Barbara with it. In fact, it was
his experience with the film and the association he formed between Santa Barbara and the “life of
pleasure and sex” that he aspired to. Thus, he made the decision to pursue a move to Santa Barbara and
attend school there.148
What we can glean from this is that Rodger marked Santa Barbara as a symbol of success with
women and social belonging, and presumed that a move there to attend school would be the catalyst for
a positive change in his life. We will consider Rodger’s ruminations in his manifesto considering
John Thompson’s theories in Media and Modernity. Per Thompson, the modern subject lives in a society
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in which the forces determining their existence are far beyond their concrete comprehension, experience,
or control. In this setting, individuals primarily experience their society via mass media, and cross
reference its concepts and images with their own personal experience. People find media that aligns with
their experience, media which directly contradicts it, and in some cases media which allows them to
reinterpret their experiences. In the case of Elliot Rodger, in at least one case he internalized images and
concepts which did not correlate to his reality, and found the dissonance between the two deeply painful.
Rodger does not explicitly state this in his manifesto, but a causation can be pieced together by
considering his expectations of life in Santa Barbara, his experiences there, and the choices he made
thus.
Another important note about Alpha Dog is that one of its major thematic elements is
appropriation of “gangsta” mannerisms and style by presumably middle class white teenagers, and their
use of the signifiers of blackness to bolster their personal senses of masculinity. While Rodger does not
directly speak to this on page 61, issues of race, masculinity, and sexuality are demonstrably strong
themes in his manifesto and online activities. Alpha Dog depicts a particularly curious Southern
California in which various cultural identities are continuously renegotiated and exist in a state of
becoming. Not only do many of the white characters embody and perform stereotypically “black” style,
one of the film’s prime antagonists is a neo-Nazi skinhead who is also ostensibly Jewish. A sex scene
with the character and his girlfriend reveal Nazi flags and paraphernalia in his room, but in another
scene, he is referred to as a “kike” during a fight. This is explained at no point during the film, but the
person depicted in the film, Ben Markowitz, was indeed Jewish.
In any case, it is easy to see how Rodger would appreciate a film in which racial and gender
identities in a Southern California much like his own are hybridized and reordered. Looking at films of
the 1990s which depict Los Angeles and its suburbs, we can observe consistent themes of racial tension,
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but also violent white masculinity. In both “Alpha Dog” and “American History X”, white supremacist
skinheads are shown having aggressive sex with women in the foreground of Nazi symbols, and in the
case of “American History X,” Edward Norton’s character brutally kills a black gang member for
attempting to steal his car moments afterward. Southern California is one of America’s most diverse
regions, and “angry white man” sentiments in the city have occurred in numerous films, most notably
“Falling Down” starring Michael Douglas in which the lead character responds to being laid off from his
job as an engineer with a killing spree across a multiracial and violent Los Angeles, a narrative which
many film critics have boiled down to a violent response to a decentered white masculinity. “Falling
Down” overlaps with Martin Scorsese’s “Taxi Driver”, another film about white men fighting back
against a newly deterritorialized urban space. Rodger’s California compared with Breivik’s Oslo, shares
an intersection of symbols regarding race, masculinity, sexuality, and the imagined “Other”. It is
important to note that Rodger himself may not have seen “Falling Down” or “American History X”, but
if we allow that images and concepts reverberate and recreate themselves within the field of mass media,
we can see that images of Los Angeles in the media during Rodger’s upbringing reflected conflicts of
race, identity, and reterritorialization. Recalling Thompson, we conclude that Rodger’s own experience
growing up in Southern California was fundamentally conversant with the media’s depiction of his own
environment. In short, scenes and symbols of white masculinity asserting itself through violence is a
theme foreign to neither of these young men, and their manifestos and acts can be taken as efforts on
their part to add their own spin to the same basic story.
On the lighter side of cinema, the wake of the Isla Vista shootings saw a debate in the media
about the comedy films of Judd Apatow and Seth Rogen and their role in Rodger's motivations. Feminist
film critic Ann Hornaday argued that the narratives of Apatow and Rogen's movies fed into the cultural
issues around male sexual entitlement which constituted part of Rodger's worldview, and Rogen fired
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back that it was preposterous for her to imply that the content of his films “caused a lunatic to go on a
shooting spree.”149 This was an unfortunate choice on Rogen's part, to pathologize Rodger's attacks and
again portray him as an isolated mentally ill person as opposed to an individual whose experience of the
world is fundamentally informed by mass media. The crux of Hornaday's argument was that Rogen's
films typically revolve around a “nerd” or non-conventionally desirable male who through some feat
ends up in a relationship with a “hot blonde” or some other such stereotype of ideal feminine beauty150.
While it may appear that this is a progressive narrative, in that it shows a man does not have to
embody the social ideal of masculinity to form successful relationships with women, feminist critics
have pointed out that the definition of a successful relationship put forward is the attainment of a woman
who embodies the idealized feminine. In these movies, men can surmount their difficulties as a
marginalized man, but the object of their affection is always an idealized woman. Not only that, the
narrative is as much a vision of universal sexual entitlement for men as it is anything else. Rodger
certainly perceived himself as a marginalized man, stating in online comments and his personal writings
that he felt women lacked interest in him due to his Asian heritage on his mother's side. From
Hornaday's perspective, the idea that he could achieve success with “hot blondes” despite his
marginalized status could be damaging to Rodger's troubled mind if his experience failed to mirror it. In
this way, we can see how the messages in Apatow’s films could contribute to this problem in this
specific case, in that Rodger received a utopian vision of sexual fulfillment which did not mirror his
reality. This would of course be another case of dissonance between media consumed and lived
experience, and contribute to Rodger's feelings of dejection and isolation. In any case, once we accept
that a dissonance between media and experience translates to a feeling of isolation from society,
Hornaday's argument appears more cogent and Rogen's argument begins to fall flat. If society exists in
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the abstract beyond concrete observation, it stands to reason that modern societies are continuously
recreated through their media if not by it. Accepting Thompson's argument, we can locate Rodger's
radicalization in the dialog between the media he consumed and his lived experience.
The world that Rodger perceived via his media consumption was idealized and had very little to
do with the life experience of most people. In fact, films like “Alpha Dog” are generally pointed to by
cultural theorists as examples of a certain escapism, i.e. an intentionally unrealistic image and narrative
which is different from the average person's life by design. Unfortunately, Rodger seems to have lacked
the perspective to work this out for himself. We can hardly fault him for failing to note that his lived
experience was fundamentally contoured by mass media, as this is the lot of all modern subjects, but we
can and should observe the extent to which his media consumption combined with his experience to
produce such a tragic outcome.
One event appears to be a major focal point in Rodger's trajectory towards the “Day of
Retribution”. In his manifesto, Rodger describes an incident in which he was at a party and came across
some “loud and obnoxious boys”, and became enraged at his perception that women were attracted to
obnoxious and hypermasculine men instead of him.151 Possibly due to his state of intoxication, he
attempted to push some of the young men and women off a ledge, and in the ensuing fight was pushed
from the ledge himself, breaking his leg. After the fact, he also noticed that his designer sunglasses and
an expensive gold chain had been stolen.152 This account is confirmed by the Santa Barbara Sherriff’s
Department, on page 45 of their report.153 The feelings of humiliation after this incident, combined with
the fact that neither of his parents were willing to allow him to stay with them in its wake, appears to be
the next point of departure in Rodger's development from troubled young man to mass killer. Not only
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was he unable to achieve his goal of physical violence against the “boisterous boys” he hated, but he
was unable to articulate to those closest to him his reasons for attempting it, nor would his family care
for him as he physically recovered. Rodger wrote in his manifesto that he had gone out that night with
the intent of meeting women and socializing, and that he had viewed it as “his last chance”, not to prove
himself, but for humanity to prove its value to him by accepting him, and ultimately loving him.154
Rodger was unable to realize this goal that night, and in fact was convinced more than ever of the
necessity of his “Day of Retribution”. The experience of physical violence and the perceived inability to
communicate this experience to the people close to him can be read as a fundamental point of departure
regarding Rodger’s ability to “speak”. As Rodger explicitly states in his manifesto, it is at this point that
he “gave up” on his relationships with other people. Rodger also noted that his possessions were in the
hands of “evil, wretched, thugs”, who would use them to “buy drugs.”155 We cannot say for certain, but
given Rodger’s other media interests and the origins of many ideas it is safe to assume that this is
racially coded language. Much like Breivik, Rodger struggled with a conception of masculinity which
was centered outside of whiteness. Not only that, his Chinese heritage on his mother’s side pushed him
even further from the ideal of masculinity and beauty he aspired to.
If it seems strange that Rodger would stake so much on the media as his means of understanding
the world, perhaps we should again center his troubled family relationships and point out that he had
difficulty meaningfully interacting with those closest to him. It is presumed that a normal well-adjusted
person exists in conversation with the people around them, and that these relationships are much more
meaningful and helpful to their understanding of their experience than the media they consume. For a
person who struggles to communicate with friends and family, however, mass media will play a much
more prominent role in the formation of their identity. Rodger's writing on his self-concept and his
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experiences may seem very extreme and vivid to the reader, but since teen movies were much more
foundational to his self-concept than his interpersonal relationships, it is more easily understood.
Rodger is certainly not the only young heterosexual man to perceive that his relationships with
women do not measure up to the idealized standard put forward in mass media, and in fact there is an
entire industry devoted to solving this problem and helping these young men interact with women
“successfully”, scare quotes intended. Dating back to the 1970s, the “seduction community” is a
collection of organizations and writers which seek to teach men conversation techniques and basic
psychology to become more successful with women.156 Feminists have criticized the movement and its
proponents in detail, making the point that it boils down women's agency to “biological” drives and
“evolutionary” processes, and that centering sexual success with women around concepts of involuntary
responses to male actions falls under the auspice of rape culture.157 One especially strong critique of the
“pick up artist” idea is the notion that “biological” reasoning as applied to humans is “always already”
colored by cultural presuppositions and the historical conditioning of the scholar in question.
Much like Maslow's ideas were filtered through Charles Darwin's thought and then applied to
human societies under the auspice of “Social Darwinism”, the biological basis of the seduction
community's program is cultural ideas about men and women filtered through pseudoscience. Rodger
himself spent a good amount of time perusing the “seduction community” and its ideas, ultimately
finding that its techniques were unsuccessful in his own life, and that its ideas were false. There is a link
between a supposed biological approach to seduction and the “economization” of sexuality under
neoliberal policies. The notion that scientific reasoning can be applied unilaterally to human reality is
not local to fringe ideas, and in fact can be observed in wide ranging aspects of government policy.
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Scientific reasoning is often combined with economic rationalism to boil down more and more aspects
of human affairs to market forces158.
This moves us to the next phase in Rodger's development as a thinker, and takes us to an even
darker corner of popular culture. The “seduction community” has been characterized by feminists as
positing women in a “state of nature”, and implying that they can be manipulated and enticed by
techniques from basic psychology. Many men who have not experienced success with these techniques
and ideas, however have formed their own movement, an “anti-pick up artist” community. Sadly, these
opponents of the seduction community do not embrace feminism or the idea that human relationships
cannot be understood in terms of biology or evolutionary psychology. On the contrary, they embrace a
much deeper and more vicious hate of the feminine, and locate their failure to form relationships with
women within a deep pathology in women themselves. This is the Elliot Rodger we find at the end of
the manifesto, one who concludes that women should be kept in concentration camps and used only to
breed more people, and that a world without women and sexuality would be his vision of utopia. Rodger
was a participant on “PUAHate.com”, and in his manifesto, wrote that he attempted to share the
viewpoints he read on the website with his friends and family, only to be met with derision or
disinterest159.
A given society's media will generally reproduce its economic and political realities in its
narratives and imagery, and in conversation with this concept we can read Rodger as attempting to enter
the idealized image world of his consumed media via the self-improvement techniques he absorbed
online. At this point we can make a comparison with Anders Breivik, who was himself an avid
bodybuilder, underwent plastic surgery, and even utilized international dating services in his pursuit for a
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successful relationship with a woman. Unfortunately, when Rodger ultimately rejected these principles
as they applied to his own life, and rejected the narratives in mass media which contoured his desires for
human connection and belonging, he saw himself left only with apocalyptic violence. Rather than
imagining a different world or a different perspective, destroying humanity and the feminine itself was
the only model he perceived for solving the basic problem of his struggle to form relationships with
other people.
In a tragic turn, Rodger's repeated efforts to communicate and form relationships with other
people, women especially, turned him against other people and convinced him of their inadequacies
rather than demonstrating to him a need to improve himself or approach these situations from a different
perspective. In the end, his location of these difficulties in other people led him to reject the value of
humanity itself, especially the value of women's lives, and he concluded that an act of mass violence
was the only way to assert himself as the “true alpha male”.
CHAPTER 4: ELLIOT RODGER’S INTELLIGIBILTY
In the case of Anders Breivik, his 2011 attacks were described both as far right terrorism and as
the act of a mentally ill person. Not only that, his attacks were situated by the media within the
spectrums of various social antagonisms, examples being gender, Islamophobia, European populist
politics, and the question of immigration to Europe. In the case of Elliot Rodger, however, there were
only two predominating themes in media coverage of his life and attacks, namely mental illness and
misogyny. Misogyny is a wide concept with numerous different interpretations, but two specific stripes
of misogyny have been identified by most American commentators. The question of Rodger’s mental
illness is similarly divergent, with scholars and commentators attributing his personal issues and violent
actions to a series of different cognitive or personality disorders. Rodger’s media coverage centered on
these two issues, while that on Breivik dealt with a wider array of subjects, since Breivik’s act was more
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immediately communicative and touched on a wider array of symbols. With the same issues of
communication, misogyny, and violence were present in both cases.
The first strain of misogyny presented by the American media about Elliot Rodger is the idea of
an individual who possesses antipathy towards women, feelings of sexual and emotional entitlement,
and violent urges toward women who fail to meet these entitlements.160 The most important element of
this narrative is that it locates the problem within the individual themselves, and describes a purportedly
deviant or aberrant behavior161. In the cited article from Alligator, there is a reference to nice guy
syndrome, a choice of words which implies pathology. A stronger variant is the presentation of these
sentiments as far reaching cultural problems, as opposed to one individual's deviancy.162 In any case,
Elliot Rodger's motivations and personal writings have been presented largely through either a personal
or cultural lens, as opposed to a political or historical viewpoint. This raises the old debate of “personal
vs. political” and in some ways obscures the clear historical implications of Rodger's writings and ideas.
It is important to consider these subjects through multiple modes of thought and demonstrate how the
structure of his manifesto, attacks, and mass media coverage demonstrate trends and issues in our
current epoch. Rather than simply being mad or a “killer virgin”, it is much more productive consider
Rodger and his attacks as informed by and conversant with today’s political landscape. Following that
point, we must also consider his shootings to be communicative acts intelligible within today’s social
paradigm. Not only that, we can see within Rodger’s manifesto the extent to which he clearly articulates
points relevant to today’s debates in the field of gender politics.
On page 57 of his manifesto, Rodger wrote that at 17 he dedicated much of his personal time to
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studying history, politics, and sociology, and forming his own ideology which would correct the
problems he observed around him.163 The political agenda Rodger laid out in the end of his manifesto is
unrefined, and positions gender and sexuality as the basic defining characteristic of human societies.164
While his views were not articulated in “political language” and did not consist of actual policy
positions, he did outline the essential structure of his ideal society. It also demonstrated a curiously
materialist and essentialist view of human gender, and its emphasis on gender segregation and
separatism show a curious similarity to other political paradigms based on principles of separation and
difference165. Again, if we dissolve the distinction between personal and political views Rodger's entire
manifesto can be read as a political memoir not unlike Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf, and the groups and
individuals associated with his ideas can be viewed as a political coalition of sorts. Strangely enough,
Anders Breivik’s manifesto contained similar sentiments on segregation and sexuality, and suggested
that human sexuality should be controlled and regulated via governing institutions.166
On DailyKos.com, blogger “OllieGarkey” wrote that Elliot Rodger was influenced by the “men's
rights movement.” Men's rights advocates, or MRAs in shorthand, are individuals and organizations,
mostly in the English-speaking world who feel that culture and government policy discriminates against
men. Common grievances include child support and alimony laws, obligations for adult males to register
for the draft, disparities in domestic violence prosecution, and declining male incomes relative to women
in some demographics. “OllieGarkey”, while acknowledging the role of “MRA” ideas in influencing
Rodger's personal views, ultimately finds the causality for the attack in Rodger's documented mental
illness.167 “OllieGarkey” also makes the point that Rodger refused most of the psychiatric help he was
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offered by his family, and chose instead to delve deeper into the “manosphere,” the corners of the
internet where “MRAs” congregate and share their ideas.168 While it seems noncontroversial that Rodger
was mentally ill, we return to Foucault’s insights on madness. If we view “OllieGarkey”'s article
through this lens, it appears that he implies Rodger rejected the opportunity to normalize his thinking
and return to the mainstream discourse, and that his embrace of MRA ideology is a function of his
mental illness. We can compare this with the efforts of the international press to expound on Anders
Breivik's supposed “paranoid schizophrenia” as opposed to discussing far right populist currents in
European politics. In both cases, it is evident that official diagnoses or consensuses were very sparingly
reached, and that there is a larger question behind the debate on the shooter’s mental health.
“OllieGarkey's” piece quoted above was itself a rebuttal to criticisms of his earlier association of
Elliot Rodger with the MRA movement in response to Rodger's attacks. While the author does not
describe Rodger himself as a political agent or domestic terrorist, he does link his personal views with
those expressed on MRA websites. Rather than describing MRAs as political actors or purveyors of a
political agenda, he sticks with the predominant interpretation of their ideas within their media coverage,
namely one of personal deviance or transgression, albeit in a collective expression. This larger trend of
relegating fringe political ideas to personal “hate” or the projection of personal failure onto imagined
social oppression, while well intentioned, obscures the reality that these ideas and movements have
political implications.
With respect to the MRA movement, the consensus in most media coverage is that it is best
described as an organic backlash to feminism and greater gender equality in modern societies. This is
reasonable enough, but scholars have increasingly denounced it as reductive and guilty of reproducing
the narrative of MRAs themselves. Ana Jordan writes that MRA rhetoric in the United Kingdom, for
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example. is largely founded upon a process of coopting feminist rhetoric and theories but applying them
to men.169 We can compare this with Breivik’s focus on the human rights of so called indigenous
Europeans facing a genocide at the hands of Muslim settlers. This is the face of the 21 st century right, an
effort to coopt feminist, antiracist, anticolonial, and other struggles and theories in the service of white
male identity politics. What this implies is that men who embrace MRA ideas may in fact find
themselves marginalized and disadvantaged, but attribute their troubles to gendered oppression as men
rather than other forces. For example, in much of the United States, manufacturing jobs have been
outsourced to the developing world. These jobs have historically been dominated by men, and as result
men in these places may find themselves marginalized across what appear to be gendered lines, as
traditionally “feminine” job markets like customer service and health care remain resilient. This is a
highly complex and nuanced perspective, a far cry from the reductive notion of “backlash”. It is also
telling that the conflation of one form of marginalization for another can also be applied as a theory to
modern white nationalist movements, sovereign citizens’ groups, and the unforeseen success of US
presidential elect Donald J. Trump in the 2016 election cycle. For another comparison with the 2011
Norway attacks, we can see the increased economic instability brought on by Kare Willoch’s 1980s
policies and the ensuing cultural resentment amongst Progress Party members.
In the realm of the cultural, we return to the subject of free market logic and its applications to
other areas of human experience. Rodger and Breivik were famous enemies of feminism, but the term
took on meaning in ways at different points in their writing. Beyond that, feminism is hardly a static
concept or set of ideas and has a historical trajectory all its own. Regarding American feminism, we look
to Nancy Fraser’s explanation of its development. Fraser asserts that feminism in the United States
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focused on issues of political economy and structural inequality for the first few decades of its existence,
either aligning itself with collectivist economic thought or critiquing it from a gendered perspective.170
For Fraser, the event which changed this emphasis in feminist thought was the fall of communism and
the sudden resurgence of neoliberal economic thinking, in tandem with globalization.171
The new focus of feminism was cultural politics and issues of androcentric cultural values, to use
the author’s words. In other words, the focus of feminist rhetoric and theory became focused on cultural
issues, and divorced in many cases from material critiques 172. This resulted in a feminism which was
unable to contend with material and structural gender discrimination. Fraser makes a point to note that
this was not a principled decision, but rather a response to a new historical context in which social
democracy and its legacy were no longer a source of political legitimacy173. The implication here is that
feminist theory has in some ways adjusted itself to the assumption that there is no alternative to
neoliberal capitalism and market-based forms of political economy. If there is a lesson to be learned at
this point, it is that these assumptions have created a field of cultural struggle and discourse in which
political economy and material questions are increasingly obfuscated. In Elliot Rodger’s writing, the
only times he mentioned economic questions were cases in which they were subordinated to gender or
related to status and prestige, all cultural issues in his mind. If MRA discourse is indeed an inversion of
feminism which coopts rhetoric of gender discrimination and victimization and applies it to men, it
stands to reason that the feminism of Elliot Rodger’s America is the “neoliberal cultural feminism” of
Nancy Fraser, and his thinking on gender is its inversion. As discussed in the previous chapter, the
cultural antagonisms present in both Rodger and Breivik’s writings constitute mutually complementary
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systems in which two opposites follow the same internal logic and perpetually inform each other. This is
not to say that misogyny and feminism are locked into a cycle intrinsically, but rather that in mass media
discourse the systems function together in such a manner.
In Rodger's writing, he states that sexuality is the root of the problems of modern society. In the
final pages of his manifesto, he writes that women are the root of inequality between men, and that
without the power to withhold or grant sexual fulfillment to men they would be unable to cause the
“impurity” and “degeneracy” in today's world.174 Any student of modern political history has seen the
concepts of “impurity” and “degeneracy” used in political tracts, from the essays of Nazi eugenicists to
Max Nordau's Degeneration where he describes the moral and social decay of modern European society.
The location of societal problems within specific demographics or ideas is also a hallmark of far right
politics throughout modern history, a familiar example being Nazi attribution of Germany's economic
woes to the supposed machinations and treachery of Jewish Germans. For non-western examples, we
can look to persecution of ethnic Chinese people across Indonesia’s history and Idi Amin’s persecution
of Indian Ugandans during his tenure as the African nation’s leader. Another important note on Rodger’s
thought is that his theory of gender politics is ahistorical, and suggests a power dynamic between men
and women irrespective of historical or regional context. Rather than harkening to an idealized past and
culture, as Breivik does, Rodger’s thought presents itself as corrective of an error fundamental to
humanity itself. In short, Rodger’s manifesto presented itself as a progressive theory and a way forward
for humanity, as opposed to a recovery of an ancient past. Most importantly, male sexual entitlement and
fulfillment are the cornerstone of his ideology, and serve as the fulcrum of his diagnosis of modern
problems.
In Rodger's vision of a utopian world, women are isolated from men and the majority are starved
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to death in concentration camps.175 The remaining female population is used solely for reproduction, and
eugenic methods are used to “breed their depraved nature out of them.”176 These are abhorrent and
unrealistic ideas, but they do not exist in a vacuum. “MRAs” can often be found on the internet
advocating for woman-free societies, and again Rodger is certainly not the originator of eugenics nor the
first proponent of concentration camps. Another important component of his ideal world is the notion
that his society is led by a single authoritarian leader, and that democracy and notions of “equality” are
dispensed with.177 This is another point at which we see striking similarities between not only Rodger
and Anders Breivik, but also both mass shooters and broad swaths of far-right discourse online. Beyond
that, there are clear similarities to many common tropes in right wing politics and fascist ideology
throughout modern history. For example, media commentators have observed a trend in the upper
echelons of the technology industry wherein “democracy” is rejected in favor of authoritarian political
ideologies and “inegalitarian” views.178 While Rodger and Breivik conceive of their political subjectivity
differently on a surface level, Rodger's hate for the “sexually active alpha male” and Breivik's concerns
over the “feminized native European man” and his inability to defend against an imagined Muslim
invasion share clear similarities and symbolic preoccupations. In both cases, there is an imagined
“Other” who enjoys some degree of sexual fulfillment and belonging, in contrast to the white male hero
of both manifestos (the mass shooters themselves) who are shut out from this experience. While at first
glance it would appear that Breivik’s themes are both racial and gendered, whereas Rodger’s thought
was solely gender based, a closer reading shows that this is not the case. Rodger in some cases applies
white nationalist logic to questions of gender, and favors gender segregation the same way Breivik
favors mass deportations of Muslims from Europe.
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While gender was viewed by media commentators as the main fulcrum of Rodger's motivations,
many of his writings both online and in his manifesto reveal opinions about race as well. A New York
Daily News article quotes Rodger as voicing his frustration and disgust in seeing an interracial couple,
stating he found it abhorrent that a young black man could attract a white girlfriend and he was not.
Rodger's logic was founded on the notion that the black man was a “descendent of slaves”, while he
himself was descended from “British aristocracy.”179 Rodger is also quoted as saying he “deserved it
more”. This discomfort with interracial dating and antipathy for black males can be read as personal hate
and deviance, but can also be understood in terms of much larger cultural narratives about race and
sexuality in American history. A connection to politics can be drawn in terms of “miscegenation” laws
and ideas about “racial purity” which informed Jim Crow segregation policies. Viewed in terms of the
right-wing ideologies and groups Rodger has been linked to, it is characteristic of a set of ideas
concerned with authoritarian governments, antipathy for democracy, and a fundamental rejection of
modernity and its values. This can be compared with the imagery of sexual violence in Breivik's
depiction of “the Islamic conquest of Europe”. Once again, we can locate Rodger’s rhetoric within the
bounds of a perceived cultural antagonism.
Rodger also discussed his own ethnicity and commented on his Asian heritage, noting that being
half Asian on his mother's side made him “inferior” to the white standard of masculinity he felt judged
against. In his manifesto, he recounted an experience at a party in which he became enraged at the sight
of a young man of Asian descent talking to a “beautiful white girl.”180 For Rodger, this was especially
unsettling as he had long felt that his partial Asian heritage was a factor in his lack of success with the
women he was attracted to. A post on the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund website
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quotes Rodger as noting in his manifesto that he had previously attempted to bleach his hair blonde
because he felt that blonde people were “more beautiful.”181 Rodger's attempts to fit into an idealized
blonde image of powerful masculinity certainly cannot be lost on any student of cultural images, and his
tragic reading of his self-concept within the confines of a specific ideal of masculinity are consistent
with National Socialist aesthetics of the ideal “Aryan” male. These images also make regular appearance
in Breivik's writing, and have been interpreted as informing Breivik's choices to pursue intensive weight
training and plastic surgery to “improve” his facial structure. In both manifestos, the authors posit an
ideal of masculinity that they themselves are marginalized from, and this is put forward as the root of
their personal troubles or the social issues they perceive.
It is also important to consider what media images and narratives Rodger evaluated his
experience against, and what led to his feelings of sexual entitlement and rejection. While Rodger's
evidence and accounts of his difficult life are based in his personal experience, applying John
Thompson's theory from The Media and Modernity reveals a causal link between Rodger's historical
setting and his personal experiences. Thompson writes that the modern subject receives from mass
media the vocabulary they use to understand their world. What this means is that Rodger, in any of his
experiences, was conditioned by his consumption of mass media. Rodger certainly perceived the same
norms and ideals of heterosexual relationships projected by mass media, and found that his own
experiences were in-congruent with these depictions. With these dominant narratives unavailable as a
means of articulating his experience in a favorable way, he, like many other troubled young men, sought
alternative interpretations.
If Rodger's misogyny is articulated along political lines, his 2014 Isla Vista killings can be read
as an act of terrorism, and in turn an effort at political speech. In 2014, Rodger stabbed three men to
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death in his apartment, drove to a nearby sorority and shot three female students, shot a man inside a
deli, and then exchanged gunfire with police before taking his own life inside his parked car. On the In
These Times website, Lindsay Beyerstein concludes that Rodger's attack was an act of terrorism, and
that his choice of a specific sorority was a “symbolic target.”182. The notion that terrorists choose
symbolic targets to make ideological points is not one originated within these pages, nor is the collapse
of the personal-political divide. The issue with much of the literature about mass shootings is the extent
to which the personal and political motivations are debated and split rather than personal motivations
being seen for their political context and political motivations being seen for their personal context. In
fact, there may be a question of the relevance of this question across historical epochs, as both the
political and personal, or public and private spheres do not exist ahistorically and have had different
definitions in different historical periods. Thompson refers to an evolving definition of the public sphere
in the sense used by Jurgen Habermas, and makes the point that consolidation of media outlets into huge
conglomerates has functionally narrowed the ideas and images which constituted the modern public
sphere, and subverted them to a power hierarchy which exists beyond democratic or even state
control.183 If the public sphere is under private control, and the private sphere increasingly bleeds into
what we consider to be the public, is it not true that continued application of the old dichotomies can be
viewed in service of a hegemonic agenda?
Another historical and political dimension of Elliot Rodger's motivations and experiences is the
specific parameters along which heterosexual relationships are defined. Rodger's inability to reconcile
his experiences with his expectations and feelings of entitlement speaks to a profound disconnect
amongst many young men of the 21st century, one in which they struggle to understand a perceived lack
of success with women, defining a successful relationship with a woman as an achievement. Scholars
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have remarked upon the discourse of neoliberalism as encouraging a culture of individual success and
achievement, and posited that the economization of all aspects of public life has emboldened attitudes
that an individual who does not experience success in one aspect of life or another has themselves to
blame. In “Neoliberalism, Biodiscipline, and Cultural Critique”, William McWhorter argues that the
discourse of neoliberalism as a political project extends the reach of the free market into the fields of
biopower and sexual reproduction in modern societies, and transforms the subject into a “homo
econonomicus” who seeks to maximize their capital and function as a rational economic actor in an
economized field of sexual competition and reproduction.184
One good example is the No Child Left Behind laws, which use standardized tests to determine
which public schools are effective and which are failing. By subjecting public schools to the same rubric
as a private business and cutting funding from inefficient schools, the policy has resulted in great
amounts of inner city schools being closed and replaced with private charter schools which operate
along roughly the same lines as a private business.185 In combination with the earlier notation of mass
media conglomerates controlling more and more of the global public sphere, and the subjection of more
aspects of human culture and power to market forces, we can observe a pattern in which a specific
school of economics has become the dominant school of thought for human affairs in the modern world.
In a crude sense, Rodger’s ideology is one specific critique of this system of ideas and practices.
The larger movement to optimize or streamline every aspect of human societies has spawned an
entire industry of seduction professionals. For men who perceive a lack of success with female partners
relative to their expectations, the pick-up artist offers them a body of empirical knowledge and
techniques to assist them. The notion of empirical knowledge and technical reasoning as applied to
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human reality is a hallmark of the neoliberal epoch, as is the notion that any human interaction can be
conceived of as a market and treated as an opportunity for success or failure.186
The pick-up artist and their ideas carry political implications, valuing traditional masculinity and
the alpha male and rejecting feminism.187 Elliot Rodger's links to these organizations and ideas was
indeed publicized, as were the efforts of numerous individuals in his life to improve his skills in
interacting with women. Beyond the pick-up artists are the anti-pick up artist community, individuals
and organizations who view pick up artists and their ilk as charlatans and seek to discredit their ideas. In
these circles, antipathy towards women is much more pronounced, and the focus is on the experiences of
“incels”, or the involuntarily celibate. Rodger was also found frequenting these discussions, and posted
comments on “PUAHate.com.”188 Failing to succeed with women on their own, then failing to succeed
employing the lessons of the pick-up artist, Rodger and his ilk discussed women and their perceived
vagaries, as well as their sentiments on race, economics, and masculine identity.189 While misguided and
misdirected, the sentiments of the anti-pickup artist community are in their own way a critique of the
application of free market concepts to heterosexual relationships.
While the causation between mass shootings and the internet remains bereft of a definite answer,
there are a few interesting explanations. Rene Girard's acolytes, for example, would posit that human
violence is the result of mimetic rivalry, in which two persons both desire the same thing and cannot
both possess it. For Girard, desire is mediated through mimesis in that people typically desire things they
perceive others as desiring. A mass media application of the theory of mimesis is relatively
straightforward, as the modern subject can observe and desire a wide array of experiences and objects.
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In the context of accelerated mimesis, it follows that the result would be accelerated mimetic rivalry and
accelerated violence.
A more applicable theory, however, is the idea of terrorism as mediated political communication.
Just as Anders Breivik targeted the summer camp at Utoya for its symbolic significance and relied on the
Norwegian and international press to deliver his message for him, Elliot Rodger chose a specific sorority
not only for what it represented to him (sexual denial and rejection) but also what the sorority represents
in American popular culture. Media coverage of Rodger's attack followed a similar pattern to Breivik's
coverage, with various pundits placing the blame on gun culture, misogyny, mental illness, both right
and left wing politics, and in some cases the decline of “traditional values”. Returning to Stuart Hall’s
model of communications, we observe that Rodger’s message was encoded with a certain set of signs,
and reproduced through media coverage of his attacks. Referring to our earlier discussions on cinema
and online discourse, we can note that Elliot Rodger’s acts exist within a field of symbols which refer to
the exact ideas his writing is concerned with, namely white male identity, sexual entitlement and
rejection, and violent retribution against an unjust world.
On the late Andrew Breitbart’s website, we can point to a post by notorious commentator Milo
Yiannopoulos entitled “Killer Virgin Was a Madman, Not a Misogynist”. Yiannopoulous’s post holds
many of the hallmarks of mass shooter discourse that we have discussed previously, most notably the
effort to remove the cultural and political subtext of Rodger’s thought and attacks and place it within the
field of “madness”, which is to say “non-speech.” Yiannopoulos ultimately attributes the causality in
Rodger’s attacks to the “blurring of fantasy and reality” amongst this generation’s young men, and
divorces Rodger’s thought from cultural issues of misogyny.190 Curiously, a changing relationship
between mediated communication and “reality” itself is indeed a major factor in the development of the
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“mass shooting”, so this may be a case of the right conclusion via the wrong trajectory and in the service
of the wrong agenda. What is most important is Yiannopoulos’s use of the term “Killer Virgin”, the term
used by the New York Post most notably to refer to Rodger. Again, in the New York Post’s coverage we
see the term “Killer Virgin”, part of a larger pattern which implies that these violent outbursts are a
natural response to sexual frustration on the part of the perpetrators. This is a problematic practice,
because Rodger himself explicitly said that his lack of sexual fulfillment was the exact motive for his
violent acts. Considering this fact, we can observe that at least one major media outlet directly
popularized and reproduced Rodger’s narrative and message for him. This means that Rodger’s
message, at least in these two cases, was encoded and decoded per plan.
Slate.com documented the response of the “pick up artist community” and “anti-pick up artist
community” themselves. Many PUAHate.com members ridiculed Rodger and distanced themselves
from him, and many members of the “pick up artist” community claimed that he had improperly applied
their principles, and that his killings could have been averted had he learned “the game” and experienced
greater success with women.191 The Slate commentators made short work of the implication that the
result of sexual frustration was spree violence, and made the point that both communities contributed to
a culture of misogyny by putting forward pseudo-scientific theories for explaining women and their
interactions with men. What is important to note here is that, for all their vagaries, the pick-up artist
community in many ways has a message which is compatible with mainstream discourse notably that
sexual interactions and relationships occur within a “market” setting and that an individual can optimize
themselves and their sexual capital. The anti-pick up artist thinkers, however, posit that this is not the
case, and that there are deeper forces and factors in play. The latter set of ideas rejects the premise of the
former, and does not reproduce its internal logic in terms of economic rationalism as applied to human
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sexuality.
Notably absent from Slate’s discussion is a consideration of the pseudo-scientific theories
applied to societal notions of success and failure under neoliberal capitalism. While a science of
seducing women may seem obviously unfounded on its face, the pick-up artist is ultimately just the
application of a much larger theoretical framework to a specific question. Namely, the idea that market
principles and technical reasoning can be applied to human reality. In the mainstream media, we can find
numerous examples of evolutionary psychology and biological studies as applied to romantic
relationships and their successes and failures. In the case of Breivik, he could concoct a series of farright ideas and theories to explain his experience, and for Rodger the idea of victimization by women
and the need for scientific methods to control and improve them was the answer to his difficult
experiences.
Much like Breivik's attack on the island of Utoya was an act of mediated political
communication, Rodger's release of his manifesto to the media and choice of targets and methods
utilized a specific symbolic vocabulary and did indeed publicize his ideas and associations in the media.
Rodger's attacks were much less effective in their communicative effect than Breivik's, not only because
of his diminished access to weapons and more rudimentary plans, but also because his ideology and
political platform was much less defined and explicit. Rodger himself may have perceived his ideas as
apolitical and himself as devoid of a political agenda, but if politics is defined as human relations in
terms of power and dominance, it is clear which political subjects he placed at the top of his vision of a
utopian society and which he relegated to its margins. It may indeed be true that highly communicative
acts of political violence are more likely to be considered by the media as “terrorism” whereas acts with
a less defined message or political content are defined in terms of mental illness or personal deviance,
and that “terrorism” may be defined in terms of an act's threat to dominant discourse as opposed to the
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actual acts of violence entailed.
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the last 4 chapters, we have considered the mass shooting as a communicative
media event, but also as a historical development. One question which has loomed large is when did the
mass shooting as an event begin? The obvious answer is that ever since firearms have been available to
private citizens of any polity, there have most likely been shootings in public areas. We are left with the
question of when this phenomenon began to be labeled a mass shooting. It is difficult to tell, but one
clue can be gleaned from the fact that the Congressional Research Institute’s study of mass shootings
begins with cases from 1999. Students of the media will recall that the public violence concern of pre911 America was the school shooting, and to a certain extent school shootings and their ensuing literature have carried over into the discourse of the “mass shooting”. The Columbine shootings for example,
make appearances in the literature on mass shootings, despite being formerly included in the school
shooting category. Without belaboring the point, it seems clear based on even this cursory reading of its
genealogy that the term “mass shooting” reflects a different interpretation of a preexisting phenomenon,
a difference to which historians should of course attribute to differing historical circumstances.
What historical developments could spawn the “mass shooting” as a discursive category? For
one possible explanation, we return to John Thompson and The Media and Modernity. Thompson’s conclusion is that the proliferation of mass media on a global scale, and classical liberal thought’s inability
to reconcile with the potential consequences, is that the public sphere of modern democracies has been
radically renegotiated.192 We recall Thompson’s assertion that modern subjects exist in conversation
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with mass media, and that modern societies can meaningfully exist because of the development of mediated communication on a mass scale. Thompson states that “the public sphere” exists in mediated space,
and notes that most mass media in the world, and especially that of the United States, is under private
control. Linking all these ideas together, we find that the mechanism via which modern societies function has fallen into the hands of a few conglomerates.193 Polemics aside, it as this point that we link back
to the “market fundamentalisms” of Elliot Rodger’s America. In studying Rodger’s life and thought, we
discovered the influence of free market thinking on turn of the century feminism, bodybuilding culture,
the seduction community, and shifting ideas of masculinity itself.
As the public sphere is increasingly under private control, more and more of the private sphere is
posted on the internet for thousands of viewers (we recall Rodger’s YouTube videos), and more and
more ideas circulate in which social matters are subordinated to the “natural” law of the market, it is
clear if nothing else that the traditional ways we grapple with subjectivity, experience, and the personal/political divide need to be radically changed. The relationship between material space and the mediated public sphere is almost impossibly complex. The most important point to keep in mind in Thompson’s and (Habermas’) notion of the public sphere as a media space instead of a physically public place,
such as a park or town square.194 What we can glean from the mass shooting, is that it not only has taken
place in public spaces, but also that it occurs within the public sphere of mass media. Which is to say
that by interpreting a specific scenario as a mass shooting, the media itself has drawn the physical event
into its own discourse. If there is any conclusion to be drawn about the development of the mass shooting as a media event and as a concept, it is that evolving definitions of publicness and gradual changes in
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the mechanics of how public space functions, have created differing circumstances in the media interpretations of acts of public violence. In the cases of Rodger and Breivik, we can observe this principle in
the fact that a mass shooting took place not in a country which shared cultural values about violence
with America, but a nation which shared communications and media with America.
I have different approaches have been used to analyze the cases of Anders Breivik and Elliot
Rodger. The discussion of Breivik’s life and thought has taken place on different terms than that of
Rodger’s, and the chapters on Elliot Rodger have in some ways ended up being about his ideas only indirectly. There are a couple reasons for this, some intentional and some circumstantial.
Anders Breivik supplied a manifesto which was almost 2000 pages long, and contained numerous passages which were interpolated, copied and pasted, and in some cases plagiarized. As such, his
ideology and his referents and influences were clearly displayed. Considering this, the political implications of his thought and the exact relevance of his ideas to modern European politics were not especially
difficult to parse. As noted in the chapters on Breivik, very few of his opinions are foreign to the European right, and in some cases members of mainstream European parties were understanding of his motivations if not sympathetic to his actions.195 Regarding Breivik’s politics, the only way in which his ideas
diverged from that of other European right populist thinkers was in terms of their degree, and of course
in terms of his proposed solution. This is the discursive break described in both chapters, namely that
Breivik perceived an act of mass violence to be his only discursive recourse, attempting to jump start a
revolution of “European patriots” to fight back against the supposed Islamicization of Europe.
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Explaining Breivik’s politics was very simple. The real work in Breivik’s case was dealing with
his personal background, the extent to which historical forces affected his personal outcomes, and showing where the causal links to mass media existed. On this front, it has been argued that Breivik perceived
a series of changes in Norwegian governance to be the root of his personal difficulties. Strife in his relationship with his mother and ensuing difficulties with other women was attributed to Gro Harlem Brundtland’s tenure as Prime Minister, and her promotion of a change in Norwegian gender politics. Breivik
also disagreed with Norway’s perceived laxity on immigration, and bought into the “Rape of Europa”
narrative, in which Europe is perceived as a supine woman under threat of sexual violence by the Muslim “Other”. These two feelings were not unrelated, however, and I have argued that Breivik not only
perceived the Norwegian state as a feminized structure, but also suspected that the oppressive feminine
state desired sexual violence against itself from the Muslim world. For Breivik, this created a scheme of
feelings in which he himself was erotically rejected by a feminized Norway in favor of a comparatively
stronger and more virile Muslim immigrant suitor. Diminished desirability for Norwegian men appeared
in Breivik’s writings, as did his own theories on women secretly “desiring” sexual violence. While the
motive of a right-wing populist challenge to European “multicultural hegemony” is relatively straightforward to discern in Breivik’s attacks and writings, these deeper themes of race and gender took a bit of
leg work. While the explanation is highly speculative and cultural, it has also been argued elsewhere that
cultural antagonisms lie at the root of the mass shooting, and at the very least it is hoped that cohesion
and coherence has been achieved regarding the arguments in play. White male identity politics are also
an almost universally accepted factor in the proliferation of mass shootings, and here as well this is
taken to be the case.
Anders Breivik struggled to integrate into the communications of the people around him from an
early age, and to a certain extent always felt alienated from his surroundings. We have also noted that
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his essential feeling of rebelliousness and hate for authority manifested early on and found numerous
different expressions, from the “Kebab Norwegian” and graffiti of his teen years, to his involvement in
right wing politics, and ultimately his terrorist attacks. We have also considered the utter cruelty and callousness of his acts as an intentional act, and concluded that he embraced his role as the ultimate villain
of 21st century Europe on purpose. Breivik labeled himself “the worst monster since Quisling”, and felt
that to a certain extent the evil of his act was justified in light of his effort to destroy what he himself
perceived as an unjust and evil world.
Elliot Rodger had his own taste for apocalyptic violence and world-historical destruction. On the
last page of his manifesto, he writes “I will punish everyone. And it will be beautiful.”196 He also stated
a few pages earlier, that “through my suffering, I have been able to see how twisted and wrong this
world really is.”197 In his 20 years of life as an “incel”, Rodger increasingly felt that there was something
inherently wrong with civilization itself which produced his difficulties with women. Despite their similar conclusions, vastly different methods and approaches have been needed to contend with the life,
thought, and attacks of Breivik and Rodger. Mass media outlets extensively covered the personal trials
and shortcomings of both men, and attributed their acts to numerous personal motivations or experiences. As noted earlier, the motivations presented by both men in their writings were often the motivations presented by the mass media. However, mass media coverage of Rodger and Breivik was vastly
different in one aspect. Breivik was covered primarily from a perspective of his personal life, but his political thought and writings were dealt with in detail as well. Rodger, on the other hand, was read almost
entirely as a pathological and mentally ill actor, and even his crude political and social statements online
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were subordinated to his personal issues in the discourse of mass media coverage of his attacks. To reframe the difference, Breivik was perceived as contemplating his role in the world both personally and
politically, whereas Rodger was perceived only holding views which reflected his opinions on his own
life. Keen readers will note the conundrum created for any researcher working on both cases, namely
that the political implications of Rodger’s thought were not available in primary or secondary sources.
To discuss both men in terms of the personal/political divide and the intersection of personal subjectivity
and historical reality, we had to draw out Rodger’s political views. While they dead end into violence
and nihilism in the end of the manifesto, they hinge on white male identity and sexual rejection in the
same way as Breivik’s ideas, and locate feminism as the historical fulcrum leading to modern problems.
We considered the rise of the seduction community, and the fact that Rodger heavily spent time
on bodybuilding forums. From this, we determined that Rodger was a devotee of numerous schools of
thought which apply free-market based thinking to different spheres of human reality, and hold that any
aspect of a person’s life can be optimized and perform better on social markets, whether they be sexual,
emotional, employment prospect related, or even physical. This was the alternative discourse which
Rodger sought to explain his life difficulties, and when it ultimately failed, he resorted to violence in the
same way as Breivik. While it is true that Rodger embraced ideas with economic implications, we had
not yet established the link to the realm of the political until we considered Nancy Fraser’s piece in The
Future of Gender and contended with her perspective that the defeat of social democracy at the end of
the Cold War created a field in which free market thinking had achieved hegemony. The specific context
for this insight was a shift in feminist thought from political economy to the cultural realm, which brings
us to the next crucial point about Rodger’s politics.
Despite the obvious influence of economic theory on Rodger’s ideas, economic concerns themselves never appear in his writing except when subordinated to cultural issues. Indeed, Rodger’s political
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programme is entirely cultural, but also curiously materialist and essentialist. This is the crucial insight
gleaned from Fraser, that in American politics the hegemony of “neoliberal” economic thought has created a sphere in which cultural struggles are the only real political conflict. Much like Anders Breivik’s
ideas are in no way foreign to the European right, it has been argued that Rodger’s ideas are themselves
firmly within the spectrum of today’s American “alternative right”. Thus, Rodger differs from his fellow
“anti-feminists”, “radical traditionalists”, and the like regarding his methodologies and the degree of his
alienation from social reality itself, but not the basic substance of his ideas.
It is important at this point to clarify what is meant by “cultural antagonisms”, and bring together
the discussions of the concept in the cases of Breivik and Rodger. We will also explain the historical argument in play regarding their application to the cases. Various thinkers have expounded on the changing field of political discourse and rhetoric in the Western world following the triumph of neoliberal
economic ideas after the end of the Cold War. Frederic Jameson has argued, in both A Singular Modernity and Postmodernism: The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,198 that the postmodern and the neoliberal both refer to historical scenarios in which one model of economic organization has achieved hegemony not only in the United States and Europe, but also globally. This view has been challenged recently
by theorists of “alter-modernities,” on the grounds that Jameson’s analysis overly privileges the Western
perspective. Nonetheless, our thinking here continues to reflect Jameson’s basic Marxian assertion that
political and cultural realities reflect the material foundations of the society in which they take place. As
such, we have agreed that the victory of neoliberal economic thought in the political sphere has created
ideologies which either reflect free-market ideas or assume that the market is the basic organizing principle of reality. Thus, the political field in both the United States and Europe has become a cultural field,
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in that economic concerns are taken for granted to have a default answer. In this new context, we can
observe the development of cultural antagonisms.
At the beginning of the research here, it was assumed that both Breivik and Rodger’s attacks
were intended as challenges to neoliberal hegemony, and posed as threats to the predomination of market-based thinking in theories of human reality. Breivik and Rodger’s attacks were presumed to be misguided critiques of a basic problem. In time, however, it became clear that the mass media coverage of
the attacks perfectly transmitted the basic meaning of what Breivik and Rodger wanted to say. What this
illustrated was that Rodger and Breivik did not actually challenge the paradigm of their societies, but
rather articulated cultural positions which were intelligible within the political discourse of their societies. This is to say that rather than being misinterpreted by the mass media, Breivik and Rodger were in
fact understood perfectly. Feminists, immigrant advocates, Marxists, and Labour Party members understood perfectly well that Breivik’s act was an attack on their ideals, just as American feminists understood that Rodger’s attack was directed at what he understood to be modern feminism.
How could it be that Breivik and Rodger could attack the very foundations of their societies, but
still be understood and contended with in the mass media sphere? The explanation we have offered is
that Breivik and Rodger both articulated opinions firmly within the bounds of the cultural antagonisms
of Western modernity. Marxist thinkers have defined an “antagonism” as a social system or construct in
which two diametrically opposed forces struggle for dominance and control. What is important to note is
that the concept of “antagonism” denotes that both sides constitute a cohesive whole, in that they complement each other. In our research, we have concluded that Breivik and Rodger’s thought and acts were
within the spectrum of various cultural antagonisms, and that the hegemony of neoliberal ideas in Western politics has created a field of cultural struggles in which the two sides complement each other. For
example, American feminism, in its focus on androcentric cultural values, has created a field in which
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“feminism” defined a certain way struggles with “anti-feminism”, or the opposite of that set of ideas.
While the “feminism” seen in mass media and its opposite are oppositional, they each follow the internal
logic of the other, and hence are defined via their opposition. Therefore, Breivik and Rodger’s attacks
were so successful as political and personal statements, because the symbolic vocabulary they chose in
formulated their tactics was based on the logic of cultural antagonisms.
We will again contend with the question of madness. It has been emphasized again and again in
these pages that mental illness was presented as a motivation for these attacks not only as a measured
deduction of a possible factor, but also as a possible screen for what was happening in these cases. Foucault’s notion of madness in the modern world was based on the exclusion of various knowledges and
perspectives from the development of one singular discourse for state-oriented political systems. As
such, various political critiques of a prevailing order or behaviors which deviated from the norm have
been boiled down to madness. We can in this case recall the work of historians on “drapetomania”, or
the supposed mental illness which would cause American slaves to escape from their captivity, or the
work of feminist historians on “hysteria” in the 19th century.
Initially, the working hypothesis was that the “madness” label as applied to Breivik or Rodger
was a refusal to consider their critiques of their societies, as misguided as they were. As time went on
and the research progressed, it became clear that this view supported Breivik and Rodger’s viewpoints.
What we have come to grasp is that “madness” as applied to the two men is a misunderstanding of their
attacks as communicative acts. While the two men could very well have been mentally ill, they did not
struggle to communicate within the paradigms of their societies, as demonstrated by the appearance of
their ideas and experience in the mass media coverage of their attacks. What is indeed true is that they
found themselves able to communicate via acts of public violence, motivated by a perceived failure on
the part of the modern world to meet their personal needs. This too, is not without its historical context.
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Not only have we discussed theories of 9/11 as a communicative and rhetorical act, we have also seen
that the evolving definition of the “public sphere” as a space has increasingly involved mediated communication. If it is true that “anything you do in public is political”, as Hannah Arendt commented, then
anything that occurs in the mass media sphere must itself be political. Curiously, this brings us back to
Stuart Hall and his Birmingham contemporaries, who posited that the mass media was a site of political
and cultural struggles, as opposed to a top down apparatus of control and manipulation.
Above all, the following points have been argued. The first is that mass shootings are made by
the mass media and the knowledge producing bodies which dictate what is or is not a mass shooting.
The second is that mass shootings are most usefully apprehended as communicative acts which utilize
symbolic vocabularies to assert a specific point, be it cultural, political or personal. These arguments are
largely ahistorical, and specific to our own epoch.
The historical argument is that the proliferation of mass media has created a proliferation of communicative violence over the last half century, and that mass shootings are most usefully regarded within
this continuity. Insofar as the histories of violence and the mass media can be separated, the mass shooting should be located at the intersection of the two. In the cases of Elliot Rodger and Anders Breivik, the
same core issues have been identified. Namely, both men had concerns about whiteness, masculinity,
and politics, and responded to a difficulty in communication with an act of communicative violence.
Both men also thought and wrote in a context where cultural struggles and antagonisms formed the substance of political discourse, and found their lives touched by the paradigm shifts of the end of the century in hugely consequential ways. Without downplaying their own agencies, we can conclude with absolute certainty that both men and their acts are products of historical circumstances, rather than inexplicable aberrations.
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The “mass shooting” has become a major hallmark of everyday news and discussions in mass
media. Through the lens of two specific cases, this research situates the mass shooting within a few
preexisting historical continuities and disciplines. The mass shooting is read as a communicative media
event, and is considered from the perspective of mass media proliferation, political violence, discourse,
semiotics, and turn of the century cultural antagonisms. The methods employed herein are textual
analysis, rhetorical analysis, and post-Marxian models of historical causation.
The mass shooting is an outgrowth of global consolidation and proliferation of mass media. The
mass shootings considered herein are communicative acts which articulate specific positions, intelligible
along the spectrum of notable cultural antagonisms in the neoliberal world, including feminism vs.
antifeminism, and multiculturalism vs. ethnonationalism. It is argued that these debates form mutually
cohesive and complementary ideological systems, and that a focus in political discourse on cultural
conflicts as opposed to questions of political economy has a clear historical basis in the Western world
following the end of the Cold War.
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